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Summary 
Power system simulations, power market analysis as well as power system security and 
reliability analysis now serves as fundamental analysis tasks in power system planning and 
operation. Thus, it is very useful to discuss techniques, data needs and methodologies related 
power system reliability. This work is very important both in terms of operational and 
economical aspects of a modern power system. The task of determining the reliability of a 
given power system can be a complex and difficult process. Several methodologies exist and 
the terminology describing these calculations may differ from case to case. The work 
performed in this thesis demonstrates a known reliability methodology related to a real-life 
power system. In the latter, PSS®SINCAL and its reliability module ZUBER has been 
emphasized. 
The development of a working test model has been an important part of this thesis. In the 
latter, statistical information describing the power system has been the main challenge, both 
in terms of availability and quality. The various reliability data have been calculated from 
annual failure statistics collected by Statnett and experience data from Siemens. The scope of 
the reliability analysis was to determine the affect of future load expansions. It is a known fact 
that load development can affect the reliability of the power system and potentially increase 
the frequency of supply interruptions causing higher CENS costs. However, this was not the 
case as the changes in frequency of supply interruptions were insignificant. The results 
showed a suspected CENS cost increase of 1.6 NOK. Thus, it is evident that this is due to the 
fact that the uninterrupted power is now substantially larger. The reliability analysis show 
that the given power system will sustain its high level of reliability even with the planned load 
expansion.  
A comparative analysis of the ongoing development of a methodology (SAMREL) 
incorporating power market analysis via power flow and contingency analysis and 
PSS®SINCAL have also been presented. Comparing tools describing probabilistic reliability are 
important and can act as an incentive for future development of reliability tools. The major 
strength of PSS®SINCAL compared to SAMREL is simply the fact that PSS®SINCAL is a 
developed and commercialized tool. Unfortunately it was not possible conduct a reliability 
analysis using SAMREL, which was a major draw-back as a comparative analysis of both the 
tools relates to the same test model would have been very beneficial. SAMREL is comprised of 
several existing tools and therefore rely on the interaction between these tools, which after 
my opinion further complicate both the user friendliness and process of commercialization. 
From an educational point-of-view, the work related to SAMREL has several benefits 
contributing to increased general knowledge about power system reliability.  
It is evident that the accuracy of any reliability analysis depends on the quality of the 
statistical data. The studies show that local statistical data e.g. data based on local knowledge 
or local statistics often pose as a better solution. However, such data are unfortunately often 
very difficult to obtain, leaving no alternative as to use the available more general data. 
However, it is evident that some uncertainties always will exist but need to be taken into 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
consideration when conducting such analysis. However, close cooperation with the utilities in 
combination with the utilization of high quality reliability data will after my opinion have a 
positive affect on the accuracy of the reliability analysis.  
Another important subject related to reliability is the process of identifying the critical system 
components. As shown, the main tool presented in this thesis is the consequence matrix, 
which categories the results obtained from the reliability analysis. The categories indicate 
both the consequence and the corresponding probability. Such matrixes need to be the result 
of a joint effort from both the customer and the professionals performing the criticality 
analysis, including all relevant information needed to classify criticality. The strength of this 
method lies in the fact that the defined probabilities can be used to identify large elements, 
such as substations and then be further utilized on a component level for the critical 
substation.  
The methodologies describing power system reliability have been emphasized throughout 
this thesis. The given test system and the performed reliability calculation demonstrates 
PSS®SINCAL as a tool for determining the reliability of a power system. The methodology 
utilized in this report is from the author’s point of view a good representation of a state of the 
art reliability analysis. 
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1 Introduction  
The purpose of any power system, large or small, is to supply customers with electrical energy 
at an acceptable degree of reliability and quality as economical as possible. Nowadays, after 
the liberalization of the power market, the increasing cost pressure forces utilities to operate 
their networks as efficient as possible. In the modern society, people have come to expect 
that the power supply should be continuously available on the demand. Combined with 
political requirements and directives to maintain high power quality levels, has forced the 
utilities in a new direction regarding operating and planning. In this area of conflict, 
comprehensive and detailed asset management methods considering both costs of network 
supply and delivered power quality are essential for long term success.  
Power system simulations, power market analysis as well as power system security and 
reliability analysis are fundamental analysis tasks in power system planning and operation. 
Several tools are available for solving the various tasks involved in these processes. In the 
latter, reliability calculations serves as a useful tool, both related to the current network state 
and prediction of expected future scenarios considering the long term effects of decisions. 
The need for improving power system analyses has become evident e.g. demonstrated by 
recent blackouts, such as the one that hit major parts of Europe in November 2006. This was 
mainly due to overloading of power systems i.e. operation with very small margins and 
reserve power, making the system more vulnerable. Such scenarios work as incentives for the 
development of reliability analysis such as described in this thesis.  
The task of determining the reliability of a given power system can be a complex and difficult 
process. Several methodologies exist and the terminology describing these calculations may 
differ from case to case. The purpose of this thesis is to give a precise presentation of the 
most important aspects related to probabilistic reliability. After my opinion, the work 
performed in this thesis demonstrates a state of the art overview of power system reliability 
methodology. In the latter, PSS®SINCAL and its reliability module ZUBER has been 
emphasized. 
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2 Power system development – 
operational and economical aspects 
2.1.1 Operation management and development 
Regarding operation and management of power systems world wide, it has been subject to 
major changes during the last 20-30 years. Going back to the 1950s, planning and 
construction of power systems were relatively straight forward. The power system planners 
faced an annual load growth of about 7-8% (doubling of load every 10th year), which made 
the development process very predictable [13].  In the 1960s unit sizes increased and the 
interconnections between the utilities expanded rapidly. Problems arose during the mid 
1970s when inflation and an increase in of oil prices lead to a rise in consumer tariffs. This 
new trend caused major uncertainties when predicting future demands, and required 
extended methods related to development and cost calculations. Looking at the modern 
society, electricity now plays a major role in the economic and social wellbeing of people. This 
being said, it is very useful to discuss techniques, data needs and methodologies related to 
power system reliability. This kind of work is very important both in terms of operational and 
economical aspects of a modern power system.  
  
2.1.2 Regulations 
Examining some of the recent development in the Norwegian power market, the introduction 
of the Norwegian energy act has played an important role in the managing the power system. 
Enforced in 1991 it automatically led to a deregulation of the electricity market. The 
electricity utilities now need to optimize the transmission and distribution networks from a 
socioeconomic point of view. Since this introduction, the electricity utilities have been forced 
to handle the specific costs of capital investment, operation, maintenance and also customer 
interruption cost in explicit socioeconomic analyses. New regulations have been introduced 
continuously to ensure a reliable and secure supply. Also, the regulation is focused to enable 
the Norwegian Water resources and Energy directorate (NVE) to monitor the power quality 
performance of the electricity networks and to implement appropriate measures to safeguard 
appropriate power quality levels.  
A model for incentive-based regulation of supply quality was introduced in 2001. This model 
is called the CENS-arrangement, and is based on estimates of energy not supplied and 
average specific interruptions costs for different customer groups [18]. Both planned and 
unplanned interruptions must now be taken into account. This arrangement aims at pushing 
the electricity utilities to both develop their network and secure a satisfactory quality of 
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supply towards a socioeconomic optimum. The CENS-arrangement handles only the 
interruptions with duration over three minutes, and in the beginning it just had two different 
customers’ categories. Now, it has been further developed, and distinguishes between six 
different categories. In 2003 all electricity utilities belonging to the power supply 
preparedness organization (PSPO) were forced to have an updated risk and vulnerability 
analysis as NVE implemented the regulation of contingency planning in the power supply 
systems [19]. This only heightened the need for methodologies implementing power system 
reliability analysis in the operation and development of the power system.  
 
2.1.3 Reporting systems   
Obtaining vital information about the power system performance is important as it is part of 
the process of determining the future behavior of the system. This thesis deals with the 
reliability of a power systems and one of the key elements of a reliability analysis is the 
availability of high quality statistically data. Looking at the history of failure registration in 
Norway, it all started in 1995 when NVE introduced a mandatory reporting of customer 
supply. Now, all electricity utilities use a standardized tool for the registration and reporting 
of equipment failures and supply interruptions. This FASIT tool was established based on a 
requirement specification. Initially, the electricity utilities only reported interruptions with the 
duration longer than three minutes. Prior to 1995, the registration and reporting of failures 
and disturbances was not mandatory. Nevertheless, failures since 1967 have been analyzed 
and registered for the voltage levels 132-420 kV in a common reporting system. From 1995 
on, the registration and reporting of failures and disturbances is mandatory for the voltage 
levels 33-420 kV. Statnett also introduced a new system, Statnetts 
driftsforstyrrelseInformasjonssystem (SDI), in 1998, which handles all disturbances and 
failures. This regulation was later replaced in 2002 with the regulation of system operation, 
covered in an explicit paragraph [15]. 
 
2.1.4 Importance  
This chapter gives a short overview of some of the power system developments which have 
the potential for gradually introducing reliability calculations as a standard tool for planning 
and operation of power systems. These days, such tools are being utilized to a certain extent, 
often part of the decision-making process of potential upgrades and new implementations 
(e.g. upgrading the generation / loads and introduction of new lines / cables). It is also evident 
that the need for high quality statistical data related to system operation and development is 
important.  
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3 Power system reliability in 
perspective  
3.1 Introduction 
The task of determining the reliability of a given power system can be a complex and difficult 
process. Several tools exist, however the terminology describing these calculations may differ 
from case to case. The purpose of this chapter is to give a short and precise presentation of 
the most important definitions that exist regarding probabilistic reliability calculations. The 
chapter also gives a state of the art overview of power system reliability methodology in 
general. In the latter, PSS®SINCAL and its reliability module ZUBER have been emphasized, as 
it is the number one tool available on the market regarding reliability calculations.  
 
3.2 Terminology describing probability 
3.2.1 Definition of power system reliability 
Reliability is not easily defined as it has a wide range of meanings, therefore making it 
impossible to associate it with a single specific definition. However, generally it can be said 
that reliability is an indication of a systems ability to perform its function [13]. Other terms, 
like availability, serviceability and dependability, is used in the same contents. The general 
term describing availability and serviceability in the field of system engineering is 
dependability. Dependability according to DIN40041 is the condition of an entity relating to 
its capability to fulfill the dependability requirement during or after a given time span with 
given application conditions. The definition of dependability according to IEC 60050-191 is 
the collective term used to describe the availability performance and its influencing factors; 
reliability performance, maintainability performance and maintenance support performance. 
Hence, dependability is a partial aspect of the quality of service. Dependability not only 
includes the unit performance itself, but also considers options for maintenance and the 
ability of a responsible organization to perform this maintenance, therefore including the 
performance during outage situations [2]. 
Two subdivisions related to power system reliability have been presented in [13]. 
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Reliability subdivisions: 
▪ Adequacy can be explained as the power systems ability to satisfy the consumer load 
demand i.e. do the system have sufficient facilities to meet the actual demand. Adequacy 
is associated with static conditions like generation and transfer capabilities.   
▪ Security on the other hand relates to the systems ability to withstand perturbations, both 
local and widespread. These perturbations can e.g. include loss of power generation and 
transmission facilities.   
 
Most often, reliability evaluations are in the domain of adequacy assessment. However, some 
work has been done to include security problems such as spinning reserve capacities and 
power system stability.  
 
3.2.2 Component and system states 
Working with reliability, several definitions exist regarding the electric power system and its 
components. Components in the field of reliability calculation are defined as the smallest 
considered entities of a system for modeling, analyzing or calculating reliability which is not 
further subdivided [2]. Usually, several equipment entities are combined in one component 
and the component's macroscopic performance is considered. The main emphasis is on the 
components ability to fulfill its function and therefore the duration of the fault state is also 
important. The component definition utilized e.g. by PSS®SINCAL corresponds to the 
protection tripping area of the main protection systems. Therefore, components consist of all 
equipment entities being switched off simultaneously in accordance to the protection system.  
According to IEC norm 60050-191, five different item-related states are distinguished, see 
Figure 3.1. These can be combined in an up state and a down state.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Components states. 
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The component states are: 
▪ Operating state: The component is connected and is performing the required function. 
▪ External disabled state: This state e.g. applies for thermal power stations suffering fuel 
shortage. 
▪ Idle state: The component is able to operate but its performance is not required in the 
actual operation situation, so it is disconnected. 
▪ Fault: This component state is caused by a failure. 
▪ Preventive maintenance state: The component is disconnected, with the disconnection 
being planned for maintenance purposes and not being related to any failure. 
 
Since the cause of the outage can not be assigned to the component, the external disabled 
state is included in the up state. The external disabled state is also combined with the 
preventive maintenance state and the fault state as a disabled state. The reliability of electric 
power systems is affected above all by unplanned outages. 
In the field of reliability calculation, only the ability of the component to fulfill its function is 
relevant in the sense of the component's macroscopic consideration [2] e.g. the network 
components in PSS®SINCAL are modeled with two states only. The exceptions are for power 
station units, which are described using more states enabling the implementation for e.g. 
start up failures.  
 
3.2.3 Failure, outage and supply interruption 
The term fault is defined especially for use in the field of reliability analysis according to [12], 
is any unintended change of the system's normal operation state characterized by: 
▪ Sufficient voltage level. 
▪ Intact isolation state. 
▪ Circuit state intended by the system management. 
▪ Intact equipment. 
 
The term fault refers to components as well as to the complete system and specifies the state 
that the component or system is in. This being said, it is incorrect to define the transition into 
the fault state as a fault. This transition is called a failure and defined as the termination of 
the ability of an item to perform a required function [2]. Hence, the fault state itself can not 
be designated as a failure. From this definition it is evident that the term failure duration, is 
not relevant in reliability analysis. The reason is that it only includes the state transition. The 
time span during which a component is in fault state is designated as the outage duration.  
Within the scope of reliability analysis of electric power systems only the faults that lead to a 
supply interruption is of interest, as they are the only faults that will affect the reliability of 
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the system. A supply interruption can be defined as the unavailability of the required power 
on a load bus.  According to [12], successful automatic re-closings are not regarded as supply 
interruptions. However, it is possible to regard voltage band violations as supply 
interruptions. The system is in the state of supply interruption in case that at least one load 
node suffers an interruption. 
 
3.3 The power system reliability process  
3.3.1 Overview 
Probabilistic reliability analysis of a given system is, like any other engineering analysis 
process, comprised of different aspects. These four “cornerstones” are depicted in figure 3.2.   
 
Figure 3.2 Aspects of power system reliability. 
3.3.2 Models 
George E. P. Box, a statistical pioneer, stated that no model is absolutely correct. However, 
some models are more useful than others [9]. Regardless of the analysis methods, the system 
under consideration has to be represented in a model suitable for probabilistic reliability 
analysis. In addition to the data required by classic methods like power flow or short-circuit 
calculations, reliability calculations is also based on data beyond topological and electric 
characteristics of the equipment. Statistical data for the system equipment is needed for the 
reliability calculation of the network. Another important aspect of reliability analysis is the 
systems ability to restore supply after being subjected to various disturbances. Therefore, 
redundancy i.e. switching possibilities and protection system configurations have to be 
included in the model. 
Reliability analysis is complex and computationally an extensive task, it is therefore important 
establish suitable borders for the system under consideration with respect to the given 
problems. It is not advisable, or even possible, to consider the whole power supply system 
from generation to distribution in one enclosed analysis. These limitations can often cause 
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problems when modeling network components. The challenge is to obtain correct reliability 
data for the components that contribute to the reliability but also obtain realistic results 
compared to the actual system [2]. One should also never forget that the model represent an 
idealized case i.e. it is a simplified model for the system. Furthermore, the derived results are 
only valid to the specific model and only correct to the extent that the model is realistic [9].         
 
3.3.3 Data 
The stochastic description of component failures, combined with the electrical and 
topological network data obtained from a standard dataset for load flow and short circuit 
current calculations are the input data for the actual reliability calculation [1]. This in mind, 
the model is useless unless the input data is of sufficient quality. Standard electrical data is 
often easy to acquire compared to probabilistic data describing the outage performance of 
the components [13]. A significant effort has been devoted to the collection and processing 
of reliability data during the last ten years. Since 1994, the new VDEW-Störungs- und 
Schadensstatistik has offered broad and reliable data for power systems of the 110kV level 
and above for usage of the corresponding failure models in reliability calculation. The data for 
these models can also be derived from Norwegian statistics, registered by the transmission 
and distribution companies. High quality data exist for voltage levels ranging from 132-420kV 
and has mainly been recorded by Statnett. Statnetts database consists of failure data for all 
components (e.g. protection device, overhead line, cable, transformer etc) registered from 
1998 up to today (SDI database). The other Norwegian T&D-companies use a standardized 
registration tool called FASIT [16], which offers more or less the same statistical data. 
However, despite this effort, the quality of the available data is still not good enough [9]. The 
issues related to reliability data have been thoroughly investigated in this thesis.  
 
3.3.4 Tools 
Using the models which are parameterized with the appropriate input data; suitable tools 
must be available for the probability analysis. Probabilistic reliability calculation is already 
established as a standard method for performing detailed and quantitative reliability analyses 
in numerous studies and practical applications. Tools available such as models, procedures 
and software have already been in existence since the 1980s and, since then, have been 
continually improved and adapted to new requirements. Algorithms have been developed 
and successfully incorporated in commercial network calculation software packages, making 
them controllable via a graphical user interface. As a result, the usage of probabilistic 
reliability calculation has become much easier [1]. An example of such a tool is the 
PSS®SINCAL package, which has been utilized in this thesis. The reliability module part of this 
software has been further described in chapter 4. 
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3.3.5 Assessment 
The results obtained in the probabilistic analysis are presented in the form of reliability indices 
which are expected values over an infinite period of time. This implies that the quality of the 
calculation results, compared to practical observations and statistics, only serve to determine 
the quality of the calculation results considering certain conditions. Typically, the statistical 
indices derived from relevant statistics will differ from the calculated probabilistic indices. 
Hence, the software calculations will always have a certain prognosis uncertainty. It has to be 
noticed that the reasons for this prognosis uncertainty of course include errors resulting from 
approximations, simplifications or inaccuracy of the models, data and tools used in the 
calculation. However, as long as there are no major errors in the calculation system, the by far 
most important reason for the prognosis uncertainty is the fact that supply interruptions are 
rare and thus the prognosis uncertainty is an intrinsic characteristic of the mathematical 
description. Another level of complexity concerning the assessment of reliability indices is the 
fact that reliability is made up of different aspects such as; frequency, duration and 
magnitude of supply interruptions. Therefore, no single reliability index alone, can describe 
the whole reliability situation. Instead, the indices focus on separate aspects or on individual 
combinations. So, in the assessment it is important to choose the right indices for further 
analysis in order to solve the given tasks [1, 2].  
Considering these aspects of the assessment it shows that a probabilistic reliability analysis is 
a much more sophisticated task than deterministic methods like load flow and short circuit 
calculations. 
 
3.4 Analysis method 
3.4.1 General  
In general, evaluation techniques can be classified as either analytical or as Monte Carlo 
simulation, described as:  
 
▪ Analytic method: This method represents the system by a mathematical model and 
calculates the reliability indices from this model using mathematical solutions [13]. 
▪ Monte-Carlo method: This method simulates the actual process and random behavior of 
the system [2, 13]. The method allows for a more detailed modeling of the events in the 
power system but it consumes more calculation time correspondingly. 
 
Analytic methods generate the component failure combinations to be analyzed one after the 
other with the help of appropriate algorithms. The separate failures and their effect on the 
power system and the supply situation are regarded independently from each other. The 
advantage of the analytic method is that the computation time is shorter in most cases, the 
calculation results are also easier to comprehend. The disadvantages is the lack of detailed 
modeling related to temporal succeeding events, like e.g. daily load curves or maintenance 
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schedules [2]. These events contain a multitude of states to be considered and several 
simplifications have to be done when including such events.  
The time sequential Monte-Carlo method on the other hand, simulates the operational 
performance of an electric power supply system in time. Starting with an originating state, 
points in time for failure events and restoration of failed elements are determined from the 
distributions of up-times and down-times caused by randomized failure combinations. The 
advantage of the simulative approach is that any distribution function for the component 
reliability data can be considered. Monte-Carlo simulations also enable modeling of temporal 
sequences, like e.g. daily load curves and maintenance schedules [2]. 
 
3.4.2 Minimal cut sets  
The available cut sets can be describes as all of the possible fault events resulting in a supply 
interruption in a given system.  A cut set is said to be minimal if the set cannot be reduced 
without losing its status as a cut set. The cut sets and minimal cut sets can be explained by 
the utilization of a fault tree (depicted in figure 3.3). Minimal cut sets can be used to 
understand the structural vulnerability of a system. The longer a minimal cut set is, the less 
vulnerable the system (or TOP event in fault trees) is to that combination of events. Also, 
numerous cut sets indicate higher vulnerability. Cut sets can also be used to discover single 
point failures (one independent element of a system which causes an immediate hazard to 
occur and / or causes the whole system to fail) [20].  
   
Figure 3.3 Fault tree configuration. 
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As an example, consider the fault tree shown in Figure 3.3. The system will fail if {1, 2, 3 and 
4 fail} or {1, 2 and 3 fail} or {1, 2 and 4 fail}. All of these are defined as cut sets. However, the 
one including all components is not a minimal cut set because, if 3 or 4 are removed, the 
remaining events are also a cut set. Therefore, the minimal cut sets for this configuration are 
{1, 2, 3} or {1, 2, 4}. This may be more evident by examining the equivalent of Figure 3.3, as 
shown in Figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4 Fault tree configuration equivalent. 
The identification of the cut sets in such a small model is simple. However, for large or 
complex systems calculation algorithms are necessary [9].   
 
3.4.3 The Poisson process   
Generally, the Poisson process can be defined as the stochastic process in which events occur 
continuously and independently of one another [9]. The process can be utilized when 
studying the occurrence of a certain event ℜ in a specified time interval (e.g. from time a to 
time b). The number of events between time 1t  and 2t  are given as )()( 21 tNtN − and is said 
to be Poisson distributed (homogenous). Events such as e.g. telephone calls arriving at a 
switchboard, webpage requests, rainfall or in our case the failure distribution in a given 
power system can be assumed Poisson distributed.  
 
The following assumptions are required regarding a homogenous Poisson process:  
▪ ℜ  can occur at any given time within the specified interval.  
▪ The probability of ℜ occurring in the interval specified as ),( ttt ∆+ is independent of t  
and can be written as )( tot ∆+∆⋅λ , where λ  is a positive constant ( )( to ∆ denotes a 
function of t∆  with the property that [ ] 0/)(lim 0 =∆∆→∆ ttot ).  
▪ The probability of more than one event ℜ  in the interval ),( ttt ∆+ is )( to ∆ .  
▪ Let ( ] ( ],...,,, 22211211 tttt  be any sequence of disjoint intervals in the specified time interval. 
▪ Then, the events ℜ  occurs in ( ]21 , jj tt , ,...3,2,1=j are independent.  
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When the event ℜ  has occurred, the process starts over again. Thus the time between these 
occurring events in a homogenous Poisson process are exponentially distributed [9]. The 
Poisson process relation, in accordance to the above stated is given as:  
( )( ) ( ) te
n
t
ntNE t
n
n
λλ λ =⋅= −∞
=
∑ 0 !
  (3.1) 
The homogeneous Poisson process is characterized by its rate parameter λ, which is the 
expected number of events that occur per unit time i.e. it expresses the intensity of the 
process. Regarding reliability the Poisson process is utilized regarding element failure 
frequency, which is often assumed Poisson distributed.  
 
3.4.4 Markov models 
Markov process  
Chapter 3.2.2 deals with some of the possible component states. However, when dealing 
with component states in the field of reliability calculation, only the ability of the component 
to fulfill its function is relevant. The network components are therefore modeled with two 
states only. One of the most common analytical methods used in reliability calculations is the 
Markov process. The Markov models are based on the same assumption that the components 
can be in one of two possible states, a functioning state or a failed state. The system 
description also includes the transition between the states as is evident from the state-space 
diagram (Markov diagram) in figure 3.5.  
 
Figure 3.5 Markov state space model. 
The Markov diagram is of course not only restricted to two states and the model can be used 
for relatively complicated systems. However, as the calculation time increases in accordance 
to the number of components and operating states, it is best suited for relatively small 
systems [9]. The following gives a short presentation of some of the theory related to the 
Markov process.  
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In probabilistic terms the Markov property is defined by:  
 
( )( ) ( ))(|)(0);()(;)(| itXjvtXPtuuxuXitXjvtXP ==+=<≤===+              (3.2) 
 
For all possible tuux <≤0);(  
 
The Markov term in (3.2) is valid under the assumption that the system is in state i at time t 
(i.e. X(t)=i), the future states X(t+v) do not depend on the previous states X(u), u<t. The 
system is also assumed to start in a specific state (e.g. state i at time t=0) and the transition 
between the states may be described by a stochastic process [9].   
 
The transition probability of the Markov process (a stochastic process satisfying the Markov 
property) is defined as:  
  
 
( )( )itXjvtXP ==+ )(|  for i,j=0,1,2…, n                (3.3) 
 
In terms of mathematical modeling further simplifications can be done. If the transition 
probability ( )( )itXjvtXP ==+ )(|  does not depend on time t but only the transition 
interval v, the process is said to be in steady-state (i.e. stationary process).  
 
( )( ) )()(| vPitXjvtXP ij===+  for t,v  > 0; i,j=0,1,2…,n                (3.4) 
 
An example of a Markov process (process satisfying the Markov property) is the Poisson 
process.  
 
The transition probabilities in (3.4) satisfy:  
 
0)( ≥tPij  for    t > 0 (3.5)   
∑
=
=
n
j
ij tP
0
1)(  for   t > 0 (3.6) 
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∑
=
⋅=+
n
k
kjikij vPtPvtP
0
)()()(   for t,v > 0 (3.7) 
Property (3.7) is known as the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation and follows from the Markov 
property and the rule for total probability [9].  
 
The transition rate from state from i to state j can be defined as: 
 
( )
t
itXjttXP
a
t
ij ∆
==∆+
=
→∆
)(|)(lim
0
  (3.8) 
 
Assuming that limit exist, using (3.4) gives 
 
 )0()(lim
0 ij
ij
t
ij Pt
tP
a &=
∆
∆
=
→∆
  (3.9) 
Time derivate of (3.9) gives: 
)()( tP
dt
d
tP ijij =&   
Since the transition rate ija  from state i to state j is constant, the time ijT the system is staying 
in state i until transition to state j is exponentially distributed with parameter ija [9].  
State equations  
By letting t∆ be a positive number and disregard the possibility of more than one transition 
in a given time interval of length t∆ from (3.7) and assuming that jk ≠ we have:  
)()()()()()()(
00
tPtPtPtPtPtPttP jjij
r
k
kjik
r
k
kjikij ∆⋅+∆⋅=∆⋅=∆+ ∑∑
==
 (3.10) 
The probability )( tPjj ∆  is according to (3.6): 
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∑
≠
=
∆−=∆
r
k
k
jkjj tPtP
0
0
)(1)(   (3.11) 
)( tPjj ∆ is the probability that the process does not leave the state j during the given time 
interval t∆ . Therefore,  
 










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kjikij tPtPtPtPttP
00
)(1)()()()(  (3.12) 
The equation above can be solved by dividing it by t∆ and letting 0→∆t . This is in 
accordance to (3.9). The solution is called the state equation:  
 
∑ ∑
≠
=
≠
=
⋅+⋅−=
r
k
k
r
k
k
kjikjkijij atPatPtP
0
0
0
0
)()()(&   (3.13) 
The process of solving such an equation can be a difficult task. However, some simplifications 
can be done. Let us assume that iX =)0(  i.e. that the process is in state i at time t=0, which 
can be expressed as:  
 
ikforkXPP
iXPP
k
i
≠===
===
0))0(()0(
1))0(()0(
 
Further simplifications can be done if we assume that the initial state is known i.e. omitting 
the index i from (3.13):  
ikforPP
atPatPtP
ki
r
k
k
r
k
k
kjkjkii
≠==
⋅+⋅−= ∑ ∑
≠
=
≠
=
0)0(,1)0(
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0
0
0
0
&
  (3.14) 
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The transition rates ija can be written in the form of a so called A
r
matrix (transition rate 
matrix): 
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  (3.15) 
 
The diagonal elements of the matrix (3.15) have the following notation:  
 
∑
≠
=
=
r
jk
k
jkjj aa
0
  (3.16) 
The state equations in (3.14) can now be written in matrix form in accordance to: 
 )()( tPtPA &
rrr
=⋅   (3.17) 
Giving the matrix solution:  
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The transition rates, rjjka jk ,...,1,1,...,1,0, +−=  from state j to the other states are called the 
departure rates. When the process enters state j, the system, will stay in this state in the 
duration jT . The sum of the departure rate from state j is according to (3.16) jja . The 
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duration jT  is exponatially distributed with the parameter jja . So, the mean duration of the 
state j is thus:  
rjfor
a
TE
jj
j ,...,2,,1,0
1)( ==   (3.18) 
From (3.15) and (3.16) it is evident that the sum of the columns of the transition matrix A
r
 is 
zero i.e. that the matrix is singular. This also determines that the state equations (3.17) do 
not have a unique solution. However we know that the system must be in one of the )1( +r  
states: 
∑
=
=
r
j
j tP
0
1)(   (3.19) 
Finally, by combining the state equations (3.17) and (3.19) and the known initial 
state ( )1)0( =iP , we are know able to compute all the state probabilities )(tPj  for 
rj ,...,2,1,0= . The state equations (3.17) are a set of linear, first order differential equations. 
The most common method for solving these kinds of equations is to utilize Laplace 
transforms. However, this has not been included as the purpose of this chapter is to present 
the method involved in the Markov models, not the actual calculations.  
       
3.5 Schematic sequence of a reliability analysis 
Figure 3.6 depicts the basic schematic sequence for a reliability analysis. The basis for the 
analysis is the past performance of the actual system i.e. the statistical reliability input data. 
Component outages and corresponding input data for the failure models are derived from 
appropriate outage statistics. In the reliability calculation part, contingency states or failure 
combinations are generated using stochastic methods. Then, the contingency states are 
analyzed for their effect on the customers, regarding reliability of supply. In case of supply 
interruptions, the complete sequence of events until restoration of supply to all customers or 
until the temporal expiration of the failure combination is also modeled. Finally, the 
probabilistic reliability indices for the system and for each customer are calculated. 
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Figure 3.6 Schematic sequence of a reliability analysis 
 
3.6 Reliability indices 
3.6.1 Overview 
When determining the reliability of a power system some indicators describing the simulation 
results is needed. The quantitative description of supply reliability is therefore calculated 
through appropriate characteristic indices. In the field of reliability calculation there exists a 
multitude of different indices being more or less meaningful and widespread. PSS®SINCAL 
however calculates certain basic indices and from those basic indices further sizes (table 3.1) 
can be calculated [2].   
 
Index Name Unit 
H Frequency of supply interruptions  1/a 
T Mean duration of supply interruptions  H or min 
Q Unavailability  1 (common: min/a) 
L Interrupted power (Cumulated) MVA/a 
W Energy not supplied (Cumulated) MVAh/a 
K Interruption cost (Cumulated) NOK/a 
A Reimbursement (Cumulated) NOK/a 
Table 3.1 PSS®SINCAL reliability indices.  
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Some internationally recognized reliability indices have also been included. These 
international standard indices, according to the IEEE 1366 standard are related to the network 
areas. Several IEEE 1366 standard indices exist (table 3.2). The IEEE 1366 standard indices are 
commonly used by the utilities to compare their power system to other worldwide systems 
[23]. The necessary calculations for the IEEE 1366 indices have been presented in appendix 3.  
 
Index Name Unit 
SAIFI System average interruption frequency index  1/a 
SAIDI System average interruption duration index  min/a 
CAIDI Customer average interruption duration index  min 
Table 3.2 Reliability indices according to the IEEE 1366 standard.  
When calculating the probabilistic reliability indices it is important to remember the prognosis 
uncertainty, which is not related to the quality of the models and data used in the calculation, 
but is an intrinsic characteristic of the systematic description of rare events like supply 
interruptions. 
3.6.2 Frequency of supply interruptions 
The frequency of supply interruption index is the number of interruptions in a given period, a. 
 
3.6.3 Mean duration of supply interruptions 
The mean duration of a supply interruption specifies the mean time span ranging from the 
start to the end of a supply interruption on a load node or the system respectively. It is given 
in h or min. A supply interruption is eliminated when the load can be fully re-supplied, by the 
means of switching operations, implementing of provisional equipment or repair of the failed 
element.  
 
3.6.4 Probability of supply interruption / unavailability 
The probability of supply interruptions, also called unavailability, describes the possibility to 
find the power system or a single load node in the state of supply interruption on a randomly 
given point in time. The probability is the product of frequency and mean duration of supply 
interruptions. 
 
3.6.5 Interrupted power 
The interrupted power index describes the sum of interrupted power in a given interruption 
period. The interrupted power depends on the frequency of supply interruptions and the sum 
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of interrupted power of each affected load. However, it does not depend on the duration of 
the interruption but gives an indication on the magnitude of the interruption.  
 
3.6.6 Energy not supplied 
The energy not supplied is the sum of the energy that can not be delivered to a load or to all 
the loads in a system in the period under consideration. In addition to interrupted power 
index listed above, the energy not supplied also depends on the duration of the interruption. 
 
3.6.7 Interruption cost 
Interruption cost reflects the attempt to monetarily value the damage to the customers 
arising from supply interruptions. There are many differences in the customers cost structures 
e.g. customer classifications like household, trade, commercial, industrial or agricultural. 
Therefore this evaluation can only give a rough idea of the actual economic damage. When 
including the time of the day and seasonal changes this only becomes more evident. The 
Norwegian energy act and some of the laws regulating the energy market in Norway have 
been described in chapter 2.  
3.6.8 SAIFI 
SAIFI (system average interruption frequency index) is a measure of the number of times the 
average customer experiences an interruption of supply. For SAIFI, an interruption is a loss of 
supply for longer than one minute [23]. 
 
3.6.9 SAIDI 
SAIDI (system average interruption duration index) is a measure of duration. It measures the 
number of minutes over an annual period that the average customer is without power. 
 
3.6.10 CAIDI 
CAIDI (customer average interruption duration index) is a measure of duration that provides 
the average amount of time a customer is without power per. interruption. 
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4 PSS®SINCAL probabilistic reliability 
calculation module – ZUBER  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The ZUBER program package, implemented in PSS®SINCAL, is the reliability calculation 
module. Development of the software started in the 80’s at the Darmstadt University of 
Technology and the Saarland University. Further development and commercialization of the 
tool has been conducted at the Siegen University and the Forschungsgemeinschaft für 
Elektrische Anlagen und Stromwirtschaft e. V. As a result of this new development, the usage 
of probabilistic reliability calculation has become an essential tool for maintaining power 
systems and allows the practical application in any required field [1].  
 
Figure 4.1 ZUBER program structure.  
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Figure 4.1 depicts the program structure of ZUBER, consisting of three modules; ZUBER 
calculation, ZUBER analysis and the ZUBER view. The calculation part generates the failure 
combinations and models their sequence until restoration of supply. The analysis conducts an 
overview of the failure sequences and the finally the results can be viewed in the visualization 
tool ZUBERview.     
 
4.2 Analytic method  
The reliability calculation module performs the generation and analysis of the relevant failure 
models (contingency states), including the modeling of supply restoration after interruptions. 
Results for these contingency states are presented as reliability indices.  
Then, the indices are evaluated by the analysis module. In the latter several different analyses 
might be of interest and it is therefore beneficial that the calculation module and the analysis 
module are separated. This eliminates time-consuming calculations for each evaluation.  
 
Figure 4.2 Calculation sequence. 
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Initially, the calculation sequence (figure 4.2) reads the input data compiling them into a 
computational model. The input data consists of standard topological and electrical data of 
the network and the components. Additionally, the input data includes rudimentary 
information on the protection system (location and type of protection relays). Regarding 
reliability analysis, stochastic data describing the outage performance of the network 
components are also needed. This component reliability data is closely related to the failure 
models (e.g. independent single failure, common mode failure, malfunction of protection 
device etc.) which are implemented in the software. PSS®SINCAL, as well as several other 
tools, uses models which were derived from the German statistic of outages in public power 
supply networks. If the actual network is comparable to German networks, statistical data is 
available. For other networks, the component reliability data has to be derived from suitable 
outage statistics. Finally, the input data includes some key data on the possibilities, time 
requirements of switching operations and other methods available for restoration of supply to 
interrupted customers.  
The end result of the reliability analysis is the calculation of the state indices which is based 
on the contingency states (failure combinations) and the reliability data of the involved 
components. The PSS®SINCAL module uses a homogenous Markov approach, described in 
chapter 3.4.4, for the generation of the various failure combinations. It is assumed that the 
failure probability of the components is exponentially distributed in time, meaning that the 
number of possible combinations grows exponentially with the number of network 
components. In a given time interval the failure probability for the network elements does not 
depend on the location of the time interval and disregards the previous history of the 
component. Therefore, the frequency of a component failure is assumed to be Poisson 
distributed. If the network contains large amounts of reliability elements, also the possible 
combinations grow, due to the exponential distribution of failure combinations. The high 
number of failure combinations generated by PSS®SINCAL requires a limitation for analyses 
purposes. This can be done by setting limits either for the minimum probability or for the 
order of simultaneously failed combinations.  
The generated failure combinations are then analyzed for their effect on the supply situation 
of the customers in the network. This analysis is based on a standard load flow calculation, 
using different algorithms. In case of a supply interruption suitable remedial measures have 
to be taken. The next step of the probabilistic reliability calculation is the modeling of the 
complete process until restoration of supply to all customers. This process is modeled time 
sequentially. Relevant indices are stored in a database for later evaluation.  
The ZUBER Analysis Part (figure 4.3) reads the component failure combination sequences 
generated in the calculation part and computes the appropriate reliability indices for certain 
load nodes or the complete system. Filtering the failure combinations with regards to 
specified selection criteria, enables the analysis of combinations regarded as most interesting. 
Finally, the sequence of all selected component failure combinations is listed in detail. The list 
contains information about the initial supply restrictions and any remedial measures. Also, 
their effect on the customers until full supply is reestablished can be read.  
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Figure 4.3 ZUBER analysis flow chart. 
The evaluation method available in the ZUBER Analysis Part gives an overview of the system’s 
reliability level, especially for the detailed analysis of individual aspects.  
 
4.3 PSS®SINCAL failure models  
4.3.1 Introduction 
The goal of a reliability analysis is to achieve precise results that are representative for the 
actual network. Therefore, modeling of the failures occurring in power system operation 
needs to be as accurate as possible. The failure models described in this section as well as the 
methods for remedial actions serve for qualitatively correct modeling of failure events. 
Reliability data have been collected from the sources described in chapter 6 and the 
calculations of the probabilities have been presented in appendix 4. Information about the 
various failure models have been collected from the PSS®SINCAL manual [2].  
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4.3.2 Independent single failure 
An independent single failure is the failure of one unique component. The independent single 
failure as the name suggests is independent and therefore not related to any other incident or 
failure that may occur at the same time. For each element, frequency and outage duration 
caused by the independent single failure are declared.  
Figure 4.4 shows an example of an independent single failure. The line L2 is disconnected 
after a short circuit according to the protection plan. No other disconnection is related to this 
event. 
 
Figure 4.4 Independent single failure example. 
This failure mode includes:  
▪ Automatic protection tripping caused by short circuits.  
▪ Unnecessary disconnections of protection tripping areas.  
▪ Double earth faults in power systems with earth fault compensation, if only one earth fault 
is disconnected automatically and the remaining element affected by an earth fault 
remains in operation.  
 
Single failures can occur simultaneously without a causal relation between these failures. This 
usually is the case e. g. with weather related failure accumulations. Though this causes 
several components to be in fault state at the same time, each failure is independent and the 
overlapping is accidental. Self-extinguishing earth faults and successful automatic re-closing 
are not regarded as failures. 
The necessary calculations have been presented in appendix 4.  
 
4.3.3 Common mode failure 
Common mode failures are characterized by the synchronous failure of multiple protection 
tripping areas caused by one fault situation. A frequent example for a common mode failure 
is shown in figure 4.5 were lightning strikes into the pylon or overhead earth wire and back 
flashover on two or more circuits of a multiple line. This causes disconnections of the affected 
circuits by the protection system. This type of fault situation is predominant in the 110kV level 
electrical networks. 
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Figure 4.5 Common mode failure example. 
Other typical examples include:  
▪ Disconnection of two or more circuits of a multiple line because of wire oscillations.  
▪ Pylon fracture with multiple lines.  
▪ Damage to several cables in one cable pit because of e. g. landslides or excavator works.  
 
When modeling common mode failures of multiple overhead lines the voltage level has to be 
considered. Multiple lines including circuits with a nominal voltage below 110kV suffer 
common mode failures mainly because of lightning strikes and back flashover. The electrical 
breakdown caused by lightning strikes is due to the reduced distance between conductors at 
lower voltage levels i.e. reducing the dielectric strength between the conductors.  Circuits 
with a nominal voltage above 110kV suffer common mode failures because of wire 
oscillations. Thus, common mode failures at this voltage level occur at a much lower 
frequency.  
In the case of multiple lines consisting of more than two circuits, double failures of any two 
neighboring circuits of the multiple lines have to be modeled. Thus, the configuration of the 
mast and the separate circuits is required. With multiple lines including circuits with nominal 
voltage exciding 110kV and bellow 110kV, one common mode failure for the circuits with the 
lowest voltage level and additionally failures according to the geometric configuration have 
to be modeled. In principle, common mode failures of components other than lines are also 
possible, e. g. of a bus bar and a transformer in case of fire, explosion or flooding of a 
switching station. Analyzing the VDEW-Störungs- und Schadensstatistik / VDN Störungstatistik 
shows that in recent years this kind of common mode failure is extremely rare.  
The tripping of a circuit breaker caused by a short circuit and the following disconnection of 
another circuit breaker because of overloading is not regarded as a common mode failure. 
While the cause for the first disconnection is a short circuit, the cause for the second is 
overloading. Hence, the disconnections in such a scenario don’t have a common cause. 
The necessary calculations have been presented in appendix 4. 
 
4.3.4 Malfunction of protection device 
A multiple element failure caused by malfunction of protection device starts with the failure 
of one element, normally caused by a short circuit. Normally, the element affected by the 
short circuit is disconnected selectively by the protection system according to the protection 
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concept. In case that this does not happen, the backup protection system has to conduct the 
disconnection. This is an unwanted situation, as it extends the effect of the original failure, 
causing unnecessary disconnection of the elements in the backup zone (see figure 4.6).  
This sequence is described by the conditional probability svρ . Here, svρ  is the probability for a 
malfunction of protection device in the protection tripping area of element i, with failure on 
element i. The outage after malfunction of protection device is ended after the time needed 
to recognize and unlock the fault-affected element and reconnecting the elements in the 
backup tripping area. The backup protection tripping areas are defined in the protection plan, 
i.e. which protection devices represents the main protection for the fault affected element 
under consideration and which protection devices represent reserve systems.  
Figure 4.6 depicts an example of a malfunctioning protection device after a short circuit on 
line L2. If the protection system on the bus bar of customer 2 fails, also lines L1 and L3 have 
to be disconnected by the backup protection system according to the protection concept. This 
implies an extension of the incident; customer 2 now suffers an unnecessary supply 
interruption. 
 
Figure 4.6 Malfunctioning of a protection device 
The difference between malfunction of circuit breaker and malfunction of protection device is 
that circuit breaker malfunctions only include one backup tripping area, and not like in case of 
a malfunction of protection device, all related backup tripping areas are affected. In power 
systems that are only equipped with graded distance protection relays there is no difference 
between the failure models of malfunction of circuit breaker and malfunction of protection 
device. 
The necessary calculations have been presented in appendix 4.  
 
4.3.5 Unnecessary protection operation with multiple outages  
Short circuit in a protection zone, can in some cases also affect protection devises in other 
protection zones. The partial short circuit currents produced by a fault can provoke a response 
in several protection devices and may trigger unnecessary protection operations. As a result, 
protection-tripping areas in contrary to the protection concept can be disconnected  
Thus, the failure model of unnecessary protection operation can only occur as a succeeding 
failure within the scope of an extension of the incident. This is described by the conditional 
probability sueρ . sueρ  is the probability of an unnecessary protection operation on element j 
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while short circuit on element i. The outage duration caused by an unnecessary protection 
operation is the duration for the reconnection of the elements disconnected unnecessarily. 
For determining the protection devices carrying a partial short circuit current above the 
starting threshold, a short-circuit calculation is required. Only these devices are able to cause 
an unnecessary protection operation.  
 
The cause for unnecessary protection operations may be: 
▪ Insufficient protection adjustment. 
▪ Measurement errors. 
▪ Wrong direction decisions. 
▪ Transformer saturation. 
▪ Damages to the protection device. 
 
Figure 4.7 shows an example for the unnecessary protection operation failure model. A short 
circuit on L2 causes the disconnection of this line according to the protection concept. A relay 
of the protection system on L4 responds to the partial short circuit causing an unnecessary 
operation. Thus, the effect of the original failure is extended on customer 3, now suffering a 
supply interruption. 
 
Figure 4.7 Unnecessary protection operation with multiple outages. 
The necessary calculations have been presented in appendix 4. 
 
4.3.6 Multiple earth faults with multiple outages 
The multiple outages by multiple earth faults start off with a permanent fault on element i. 
The permanent earth fault causes the voltage to increase in the unaffected parts of the 
system. In case another single pole fault occurs, the permanent earth fault becomes a double 
short circuit to earth, causing a protection operation. In 90% of those cases, both protection 
tripping areas affected by the faults are disconnected, which does not correspond to the 
protection concept. It should be mentioned that this failure model is only relevant for power 
systems with earth fault compensation. To prevent supply interruption to certain customers, 
only one of the affected protection tripping areas is disconnected automatically while the 
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other one has to be disconnected by manual operation. The occurrence of a multiple earth 
fault failure is described by the conditional probability meρ . meρ is the probability for a second 
fault on an element on condition that a permanent earth fault already exists in the power 
system. The outage duration of the multiple earth fault failure normally is the duration for 
reconnection of the affected elements.  
The probability for the occurrence of a second fault is much higher than the probability for 
the first earth fault because of the voltage increase in the conductors is not affected by the 
first fault. The permanent earth fault also has to be disconnected in cases where no multiple 
earth faults occur, which may cause a supply interruption. Using the Monte Carlo simulation 
this situation can be modeled correspondingly. 
 
Figure 4.8 Multiple earth faults with multiple outages. 
Figure 4.8 shows an example for the above failure model. After a permanent earth fault on 
line L2 the voltage increase in the power system, causing another single-pole failure on 
another conductor of line L1. This invokes a fault current similar to a short-circuit current, 
causing the protection system to disconnect both fault affected elements in contrary to the 
protection concept.  
The necessary calculations have been presented in appendix 4.  
 
4.3.7 Independent unnecessary protection operation  
This failure model deals with independent unnecessary protection operations, i.e. operations 
of the protecting system without a preceding failure. This failure model corresponds in great 
parts to the independent single failure. In some cases, though, the resulting outage situation 
is different, as only individual protection devices trigger, and not necessarily a complete 
protection tripping area like with an independent single failure. 
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Figure 4.9 Independent unnecessary protection operation. 
An example is the line tripod shown in figure 4.9. In contrary to the independent single 
failure on line L6, which would also cause lines L4 and L5 to be disconnected, thus separating 
the power system in two partial systems, the independent unnecessary protection operation 
only causes a supply interruption for customer 4. Such failures are often caused by work 
related human errors resulting in unwanted disconnections.  
The necessary calculations have been presented in appendix 4. 
 
4.4 Reliability analysis evaluation   
4.4.1 Presentation of the results 
Dealing with the reliability calculation results can often be a daunting task as the results are 
comprehensive and rather difficult to interpret. Therefore, regarding the analysis of the 
calculated results it is very important how the results can be presented.  
 
The results in PSS®SINCAL can be accessed as follows:  
▪ log files  
▪ SINCAL database  
▪ Network diagram  
 
All reliability indices can be exported to Excel sheets, and be used as a basis for further 
calculations and in the decision making processes. The log files are comprehensive text based 
files, which contain all important user-defined output information from the reliability 
calculations.  
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The following information can be found in the log-files:  
▪ Network model for reliability analysis  
▪  Sequence of separate failure combinations  
▪  Results  
▫ Results table  
▫ Sorted lists  
▫ Details on failure combinations  
 
There are two main types of the results:  
▪ Network reliability indices  
▪ Customer reliability indices  
 
PSS®SINCAL also enables the possibility to differentiate the results i.e. filtering the results 
related to specific user-defined choices such as:  
▪ Differentiation regarding failure models 
▪ Differentiation regarding involved components 
▪ Differentiation regarding voltage levels 
▪ Differentiation regarding power system areas 
▪ Component oriented results 
▪ Affected customers  
▪ Interval definitions  
 
The reliability analysis has been further described in chapter 7, in relation to the PSS®SINCAL 
network test model.  
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5 SAMREL – Requirement 
specification for reliability analysis  
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter deals with the ongoing development of a methodology (SAMREL) incorporating 
power market analysis via power flow and contingency analysis. The end goal of this work is 
to deliver point reliability analysis, including societal impacts, such as high energy prices and 
interruption costs. The motivation for including this chapter is the fact that a comparison 
between these tools could be beneficial. The main focus has been the methodology for the 
reliability calculation and available results.    
The SAMREL methodology is based on a power market simulator, a power flow model and a 
newly developed methodology for delivery point reliability and interruption cost assessment. 
SAMREL incorporates available computer based simulation and analysis tools which is part of 
the power system analysis. The problem today is that many existing tools are fragmented 
because of lack of methodical links between them. The main purpose of SAMREL is to 
improve this information exchange. Heightened information exchange and improved 
interaction between the models are advantageous because it have the potential for improving 
both the market simulations and the reliability analysis.  
 
5.2 SAMREL methodology  
As mentioned above, the development of a method for enhanced power system reliability 
utilize known computer based tools and models. Figure 5.1 depicts the SAMREL modules, 
making the reliability analysis possible. The integrated methodology will cover the chain of 
analyses from spot market clearing for electricity, via power flow in the system and 
contingency analysis to reliability studies for regional areas and delivery points.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Page 36 of 103 
 
Figure 5.1 SAMREL program structure.  
The first part is the power market simulator (EMPS) which is optimized for hydro power 
generation. It takes into account demand, supply, transmission constraints and hydrological 
conditions. The model requires information about the transmission capacities between areas. 
Considering this, the available capacity in a particular transmission line may be affected by 
the flow on other lines. Secondly, one has to account for operating limits to prevent 
frequency drop and system instability (angular or voltage). This information is often not easy 
to obtain and as a consequence the user of the EMPS model needs detailed analysis of the 
power flow and system stability to set proper values for the transmission capacities. 
The power injections on the local nodes of the given system are calculated by the 
transmission model. The input data for the transmission model is the area power balance e.g. 
calculated by the EMPS model. The results of the power flow calculation give information 
about the consumption profiles and the transmission capacities that are possible to utilize in a 
given situation. Since these capacities are exogenous input to the EMPS model, there is a 
need for interaction between the aggregated models for regional energy balance and more 
detailed models for the power flow in the electrical network [5]. 
The detailed information about production and load in all nodes are needed to calculate the 
power flow of the system and for the contingency analysis. The power system reliability 
analysis is the final part of the SAMREL methodology and is the analysis which predicts the 
long-term reliability of supply in the system. The power market and power flow models and 
the contingency analysis are the core engines in these analyses. The contingency analysis 
comprises the simulation of component outages and their consequences for the power flow 
and system problems in terms of violations of different operating constraints [5]. This 
provides input to both part 1 and part 3 in figure 5.1. Finally, the reliability of supply analysis 
is being preformed for estimation of frequency and duration of interruptions for delivery 
points and the corresponding societal costs (costs of energy not supplied – CENS). 
Figure 5.2 depicts a simplified view of the SAMREL methodology and the steps involved in 
calculating the reliability indices. 
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Figure 5.2 SAMREL methodology.  
 
5.3 Modules 
This chapter explains in detail the modular structure of SAMREL and figure 5.3 depicts the 
three integrated modules. These modules utilize three different enabling methodologies 
being a market model (EMPS or other), power flow model (PSSE or other) and the reliability 
model (OPAL).   
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Figure 5.3 SAMREL modules. 
5.3.1 Power market analysis 
The purpose of the power market analysis is to identify the hydrological optimal operation 
based on statistical data (Statistical series of up to 75 hydrological years are available). The 
EMPS model described in [6] calculates the value of stored water for different reservoir 
fillings, and it simulates the optimal operation of the power system for a sequence of 
hydrological years.  As depicted in figure 5.3 there is an interaction between the EMPS model 
and the power flow analysis, which is necessary when determining the system power transfer 
capabilities.  The EMPS model provides a set of production and load scenarios with the actual 
system transfer capabilities. Finally, through an iterative process, the constraints and limits 
(e.g. voltages, thermal rating, voltage stability and angular stability) are checked. Through 
this iterative process the realistic transmission capacities as well as the feasible operational 
states are found as input to the next step of the analysis [5].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Page 39 of 103 
5.3.2 Selection of operational states 
Regarding long term planning of a power system it is beneficial to carry out the analysis with 
all possible operational states. However this is often not possible as the number of possible 
combinations is extensive, giving a near impossible calculation effort. Utilizing this EMPS 
model with 75 hydrological series over a total of 52 weeks and 7 price sections per. week it 
would give 27300 different operational states. Including the number of contingencies in 
relation to the transmission capacities it results in millions of operational states. This implies 
the need for an approximation, limiting the number of states, and selecting representative 
cases e.g. for one or several months. This is a challenge and a topic under ongoing work [5]. 
 
5.3.3 Contingency analysis 
For each of the selected operational states a distribution of production and load per unit and 
delivery point is determined and a contingency analysis is carried out [5]. The main emphasis 
of the contingency analysis is to verify the systems ability to maintain power delivery at 
certain contingencies (i.e. contingencies leading to interruption or reduced supply for each 
of the investigated delivery points). The analysis utilizes standard power flow or dynamic 
simulations at various contingencies selected manually or automatically. A contingency list 
must be generated for each of the chosen operational states, and the contingency analysis is 
carried out for each operational state.   
 
5.3.4 Reliability analysis  
In the reliability analysis the objective is to determine the reliability of supply indices for the 
delivery points under study, i.e. to estimate the frequency and duration of interruptions (or 
reduced supply), energy not supplied and the corresponding cost of energy not supplied 
(CENS) e.g. according to the Norwegian quality of supply regulation [5]. The reliability 
analysis in this case was performed with the OPAL methodology (optimization of reliability of 
supply in power networks) described in [4]. OPAL takes into consideration the interruptions 
due to primary faults on the power system components and protection system faults leading 
to unwanted breaker operation. The input to the reliability analysis consists of information 
about which delivery points will experience interruptions or reduced supply in combination 
with fault statistics and specific interruption costs [4, 5]. For each of the operation states the 
model establishes a minimal set of cuts for each of the delivery points. These are deduced for 
each operational state, based on the contingencies leading to interruptions or reduced 
supply. Then the reliability indices are calculated per minimal cut for each operational state 
and each delivery point with fault rates, outage times and specific interruption costs as input.  
 
5.4 Time-dependent correlations 
SAMREL calculates reliability indices deduced from minimal cuts related to the chosen 
operational states. However, calculations can also include time-varying parameters and time-
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dependent correlations between them for each delivery point. Generally SAMREL divides the 
statistical material into appropriate groups e.g. component fault rates can be grouped in 
three typical time periods, namely 24 hours, 7 days and 24 months. The observed time-
dependent fault rate pattern found in statistics is the aggregated result of all causes 
contributing to faults of a particular component, representing weather related, technical or 
human related faults. A model which is able to generate this pattern, analytically or by 
simulation, will therefore produce outage events according to what is expected to happen in 
the real system [4]. SAMREL enables the possibility for including these fault rate variations 
both in analytical calculations and Monte Carlo simulations for calculating the reliability 
indices, utilizing the same representation of the time-varying parameters. The Monte Carlo 
approach is additionally capable of handling the stochastic variations in the parameters, thus 
providing the probability distributions of the reliability indices in addition to expectation 
values. Further descriptions of the time-varying parameters included in the OPAL 
methodology can be found in [4].  
 
5.5 SAMREL failure models 
SAMREL considers four different fault types or failure models that potentially contribute to 
degradation of the power system reliability.  
 
These failure models are: 
▪ Failure model 1: Primary fault in primary equipment where protection and breakers clear 
the fault correctly. 
▪ Failure model 2: Primary fault in secondary equipment or circuit breaker, leading to 
unwanted spontaneous tripping of circuit breaker. 
▪ Failure model 3: Primary fault in primary equipment combined with fault in circuit breaker 
or secondary equipment, leading to missing operation of circuit breaker. 
▪ Failure model 4: Primary fault in primary equipment combined with fault in circuit breaker 
or secondary equipment, leading to unwanted unselective tripping of circuit breaker. 
 
Where,  
▪ Primary equipment: Equipment such as transformers, lines, cables etc. (i.e. high voltage 
equipment).  
▪ Secondary equipment: Equipment such as measurement transformers, power supply etc. 
(i.e. low voltage equipment part of a control system).   
▪ Primary fault: The primary failure (e.g. a short circuit). 
▪ Secondary fault: Preceding failure either directly caused by the primary failure or occurring 
after a given primary failure (e.g. unwanted behavior related to a protection system). 
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Failure models 2-4 deal with faults related to the protection system while failure model 1 
covers faults in primary components with the premise that the faults are cleared correctly [4].  
 
5.6 Reliability indices 
Results from the reliability analysis are presented in the form of reliability indices. Minimal cut 
sets and corresponding reliability indices are calculated for each operational state and each 
delivery point. Table 5.1 shows the SAMREL indices.  
  
Index Name Unit 
OSjDPP ,,int,  Interrupted power in delivery point caused by each cut j 
per operational state. 
[kW per 
interruption] 
OSjDPENS ,,  Energy not supplied in delivery point caused by each cut j 
per operational state. 
[kW per 
interruption] 
OSjDPIC ,,  Interruption costs in delivery point caused by each cut j per 
operational state. 
[NOK per 
interruption] 
aOSjDP ,,,λ  Number of interruptions in delivery point caused by each 
cut j per operational state. 
[interruptions per 
year] 
aOSjDPU ,,,  Annual interruption duration in delivery point caused by 
each cut j per operational state. 
[hours per year] 
aOSjDPP ,,,int,  Annual interrupted power in delivery point caused by each 
cut j per operational state. 
[kW per year] 
aOSjDPENS ,,,  Annual energy not supplied in delivery point caused by 
each cut j per operational state. 
[kWh per year] 
aOSjDPIC ,,,  Annual customer interruption costs in delivery point 
caused by each cut j per operational state. 
[NOK per year] 
Table 5.1 SAMREL reliability indices.  
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6 Case model for probabilistic 
reliability calculations 
6.1 Introduction 
A case model for reliability calculations has been developed part of the master thesis and 
further explained in this chapter. The PSS®SINCAL network model has been included for 
demonstrative purposes, giving a practical example of the methodology describing the power 
system reliability. The data preparation both for load flow and reliability calculations has been 
presented. The main target of the study is to quantify the supply reliability for a given 
distribution network based on the performance of the network components and the network 
topology.  
As mentioned earlier, probabilistic reliability calculation imposes special demands on the data 
basis i.e. the commonly known data for power flow calculations are not sufficient. Modeling 
of the power system topology must therefore e.g. include the exact bus bar configurations 
(sectionalized busbars, multiple busbars etc.). The reason for this is that the possibility for 
remedial switching actions in relation to failure events has an impact on the reliability results. 
 
Other important reliability data include:  
▪ Load duration curves 
▪ Failure model reliability data  
▪ Protection schemes 
▪ Generation curves 
 
Regarding the calculations performed by PSS®SINCAL, the basic data model has to cover both 
power flow and three-phase short-circuit calculations, with representative and acceptable 
operating conditions (typically peak-load operation). In this process, the modeling of voltage 
profiles and equipment loading has to be as exact as possible. 
The case simulations have been performed on a high voltage distribution system owned by 
Istad Nett AS. The following chapters give a detailed description of the process of creating a 
working test model. 
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6.2 Limitations and challenges  
6.2.1 General 
The purpose of reliability analysis is to determine the reliability of a given power system being 
small or large. However, achieving this is not necessarily an easy task. Like all other 
mathematical analysis some limitations and challenges do exist. The work presented in [24] 
gives a short overview of the aspects concerning a reliability analysis and includes some of 
the well known challenges related to the analysis of large technological systems.  
 
These challenges are:       
▪ Lack of knowledge of the system and its components. 
▪ Lack of relevant input data. 
▪ Lack of knowledge on the reliability of the human components. 
▪ Lack of knowledge on the quality of the computer software. 
▪ Lack of knowledge of the dependences between the system components.  
 
These are known obstacles often part of a reliability analysis which potentially introduces 
several analytical uncertainties. These uncertainties can in many cases have a negative 
influence on the analysis, making it very hard to assess the failure probability and the overall 
risk assessment of a power system. The general rule of computer analysis applies; insufficient 
input data will produce insufficient results. However, a valid risk assessment of a power 
system can be carried out through the use of reliability analysis as long as there is awareness 
of such limitations. This implies that reliability analysis often cannot only rely on the 
computed result. Thus, in many cases expert opinions need to be included in the analysis. A 
general problem when using such resources is the actual process of selecting the experts 
[24]. In many cases were the overall reliability assessment on the system level is less clear, it 
is often advantageous to include human resources, like expert opinions and people with local 
knowledge. However, too much influence directly on system level assessments should be 
prevented as it often again could introduce uncertainties. These uncertainties can be avoided 
by using correct information (e.g. statistical data) about the power system. However, in many 
cases this is difficult or not possible. In general the prognosis of component reliability 
performance in dependency of the chosen asset management strategies is a vital necessity. 
However, suitable models and data for such prognosis are not easily available [14]. These are 
among the key factors that need to be considered when performing a reliability analysis.  
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6.3 Reliability of medium voltage components  
6.3.1 General  
The network components connected at voltage levels ranging from 22kV and below are 
assumed non-failure affected elements (i.e. 100% reliable components). The motivation for 
doing so is directly linked to the scope of the analysis. If the main emphasis is to determine 
the reliability in the regional network (132kV-420kV), there is no need for including the lower 
level components. Statistically, failures that occur at these levels, seldom lead to any supply 
interruptions in the 132kV-420kV network. Failures occurring at these voltage levels get 
disconnected and isolated from the power system. However, this may lead to potential loss of 
generation, but in most cases, due to high generation capacity and high level of 
interconnections, this is not a problem. 
 
6.3.2 Failure of generation sources 
Concerning reliability in power systems, it is worth mentioning the modeling of generation 
sources. It is a known fact that generation units fail more frequently than typical network 
components, which is mainly due to higher mechanical and thermal stress [10]. Usually, 
generation sources are modeled either by a two state model or by a more detailed model e.g. 
including reserves, start-up, incident operation etc. [2]. In a two-state model, generation 
sources are either “on” or “off” and compared to the e.g. a six-state model, it is evident that 
the level of accuracy is much lower.  
Regarding power system reliability it is also possible to exclude the effect of generation unit 
outages from the stochastic failure modeling. In this case, the load flow and reliability 
calculations have to be performed separately with the generator units switched off. 
Comparing these two methods it is evident that excluding the generation sources has its 
advantages. First of all, the complexity of the reliability calculations increases dramatically 
when including the generation sources, due to the high failure rate and high number of 
operational states. Therefore, results without generation units are easier to interpret and 
more meaningful. The method also allows for changing the load flow situation, adapting it to 
certain operation states, enabling the studies of these individually. Last but no least, in many 
cases it will be difficult to obtain meaningful input data for the state models representing the 
generation sources [8].   
Examining some of the available statistics it is evident that the influence off generation 
system outages on the supply reliability in public power systems is very small, which is 
supported by the work described in [10]. However, there are certain aspects that need 
consideration. The effect of an outage depends on the type of customer e.g. industrial and 
regional utilities and on the systems ability to supply the peak power demand. Finally, 
economical influence compared to the technical influence may be significant. However, the 
economical influences have not been dealt with in this thesis.  
Conclusively, the fact that the generation capacity in Western European countries is available 
via highly meshed grids, with short transport distances, the generation sources can be 
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regarded as non failure components as they have little or no affect on the power system 
reliability. This has clear advantages both for the complexity of the mathematical models and 
the understanding of the analysis results.  
 
6.4 Time dependent load modeling 
Power flow calculations usually model the separate customer loads by their annual peak-
power value, representing a worst case scenario. However, this method is insufficient for 
reliability calculations were it is evident that the customers normally do not require their 
annual peak-power during the complete period under consideration. So, when conducting 
reliability calculations, the need for including time dependencies is evident. The most 
common approach is to represent the loads according to a standardized annual load duration 
curve. The annual load duration curves are strongly dependent on the type of the power 
system under consideration. Especially the configuration of the customers connected to the 
power system (e. g. urban / rural, industrial / residential, mixtures, etc.) has a great effect on 
the duration curve.  
The various load operating states represented by the load duration curve will also have an 
impact on the reliability indices. 
 
The indices commonly affected are: 
▪ Frequency of supply interruptions 
▪ Mean interrupted power 
▪ Energy not supplied. 
 
The actual loading situation will in many cases have an effect on the reliability calculations 
and is therefore an important part of the network modeling. It is often seen that some supply 
interruptions are caused by additional disconnection of equipment directly related to 
overloading. Overloading strongly depends on the power demand state of the affected 
customers at the time of the failure. So, when running the various failure combinations this 
needs to be taken into consideration. In case of overloading in the power system, PSS®SINCAL 
calculates the power threshold when the overloading occurs. This power threshold marks the 
point below which the system operates as normal and above which an overloading occurs, 
related to a given failure combination. The frequency of supply interruptions at this incident is 
the frequency of this failure combination weighted with the temporal part of the load 
duration curve above this power threshold. Further, the mean interrupted power is affected 
by the load situations given by the load duration curve. The reason are that the mean power 
demanded by a customer increases with the load ratio. The reliability index "energy not 
supplied" depends, among other factors, on the frequency of supply interruptions and the 
mean interrupted power. Thus, the index strongly varies with the form and load ratio of the 
load duration curve [2].  
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In addition, a load priority or a load duration curve different from the default value can be 
assigned to individual loads. Higher priority loads are allocated power preferentially in case of 
supply interruptions caused by power shortages. Such load methods also, in many cases, 
gives a more realistic picture of the actual loading situation (e.g. representing large industrial 
areas or seasonal changes).  
 
6.5 Network description  
Some details about the network have been made available in appendix 1 and 2. Figure 6.1 
depicts a section of the network model. 
 
Figure 6.1 Section of the PSS®SINCAL model.  
The Netbas single line diagram for the Istad network has been attached in appendix 1. Some 
simplifications related to the size of the network were necessary to limit the extent of the 
reliability calculations. Generally, a complete modeling of neighboring systems is normally 
not reasonable, as it would evoke substantial effort regarding data procurement and 
computing time. The most important simplification regarding the network model is the 
elimination of a neighboring 132kV network. The motivation for doing so is the fact that this 
part of the network is not owned by Istad Nett AS and would have a limited affect on the 
reliability results. However, as mentioned above, some network borders have to be 
established in this kind of analysis. Other simplifications worth mentioning are a power 
station equivalent made up of all the small generation sources.  The main objective in doing 
so is due to the lack of data for these sources, which are often the case regarding small power 
stations. The purpose of the power equivalent is to recreate the power flow as accurate as 
possible in this area. Also, regarding reliability, all of the components connected at 22kV or 
lower have been regarded as 100% reliable. Thus, these components are irrelevant regarding 
the actual reliability calculations.   
 
6.6 Relevant input data 
6.6.1 General 
In this case, all the detailed information about the network and the network components 
have been exported from PSS®E and presented in tabular form. It should be mentioned that it 
is possible to import a PSS®E model directly into PSS®SINCAL. However, it requires several 
additional data elements in the preparation process related to probabilistic reliability analysis. 
Therefore, for educational purposes, it was deiced to construct the network model in 
PSS®SINCAL without exporting data from PSS®E, manually. This off course, is more time 
UNDERLAGT TAUSHETSPLIKT 
Iht. BfK § 6-2, jf. off.loven § 5a 
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consuming, but on the other hand has many advantages when it comes to getting to know 
both PSS®SINCAL and the network topology.  
The following subchapters provide information about the relevant input data (power flow and 
reliability) used in the data model. However, it should be pointed out that the values 
presented in this chapter are the minimum data foundation for performing a liable reliability 
analysis. PSS®SINCAL enables several other possibilities both in terms of input data and 
available calculation methods. However, the main focus in this report is the reliability 
methodology and therefore, the input data most relevant, have been chosen.  
 
6.6.2 Busbars and switching stations 
The information needed for these network elements are:  
▪ Busbar topology (i.e. single or double busbars) 
▪ Busbar redundancy (i.e. switching possibilities / busbar transfer) 
▪ Switching times 
 
The network topology and information about system redundancy was provided by Istad Nett 
AS. In this case all of the double busbars have been modeled with coupling breakers, enabling 
the possibility of busbar transfer. Busbars, connectors and busbar couplings are assumed 
100% reliable, meaning that they are never failure-affected. From experience, the switching 
times are assumed to be 0,5h representing a worst case scenario, after an initial 
disconnection. 
6.6.3 Transformers 
The basic data needed for the transformers are: 
▪ Rated values (Voltage levels, nominal power etc.) 
▪ Short circuit voltages (both total and ohmic part) 
▪ Vector group 
▪ Voltage control information (tap changers) 
 
All the rated values are available from the PSS®E data export and the basic short circuit 
calculations have been performed using this data. This is also the case regarding the voltage 
control. 
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6.6.4 Over head lines 
The basic data needed for the over head lines are: 
▪ Rated values (length, resistance and capacitance charging etc.) 
▪ Number of parallel systems. 
▪ Calculation of thermal limits 
 
All the rated values are available from the PSS®E data export and the thermal limits have been 
calculated using this data. Regarding reliability calculations (common mode failures) it is also 
important to determine the topology of the over head lines (i.e. the number of parallel 
systems). This information was made available by Istad Nett AS.  
 
6.6.5 Generation sources 
The basic data needed for the generation sources are: 
▪ Rated values (Voltage levels, nominal power etc.) 
▪ Operation state (maximum and minimum power generation) 
▪ Control ability 
▪ Power limits 
 
All the rated values, operation states and the controller limits are available from the PSS®E 
data export. Power flow calculations are based on this information and in this process it is 
especially important to include generation and transfer capabilities. In the latter, it is also 
necessary to define a swing bus of the system. Further analysis of the network revealed that 
the best suited generation area were Viklandet. This generator has sufficient generation 
capability and serves as the swing bus, maintaining the frequency and voltage in the network.  
The generators are assumed 100% reliable i.e. they are never failure-affected. 
 
6.6.6 Reactive elements 
Reactive power production and absorption (i.e. capacitors and reactors) are present and have 
been included in the test model.  
 
The basic data needed for the reactive generation sources are: 
▪ Rated values (Voltage levels, nominal power etc.) 
▪ Operation state (maximum and minimum power generation) 
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▪ Control ability 
 
All the rated values, operation state and the controller limits are available from the PSS®E 
data export. Normally, switching capacitors have the ability for a stepwise controller action. 
However, in this case all the reactive sources have been modeled operating at full capacity or 
as out of service.  
 
6.6.7 Loads 
The reliability calculations have been performed utilizing a sorted annual load duration curve, 
standardized to the annual peak power of the Norwegian transmission network, with a 
mixture of different customers. The data for the load duration curve (figure 6.2) have been 
provided by Siemens AS.  
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Figure 6.2 Sorted and standardized annual load duration curve. 
Regarding the test model, both the substations Hustadmarmor and Nyhamna are examples of 
industrial areas where a more thorough load modeling, reflecting the actual loading situation, 
could be beneficial. The reason for this is the possibility for load variations deviating from the 
average load duration curve. However, this is only relevant for the reliability analysis if the 
loads and the load variations are of substantial size. In this case the loads of Nyhamna and 
Hustadmarmor stand for approximately 50% of the total system load. Thus, it would have 
been more accurate to model these loads in accordance to locally available data including the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Page 51 of 103 
actual time variations. However, after an agreement with Istad Nett AS, it was decided to use 
the same standardized annual load duration curve for all the system loads, empathizing on 
the reliability methodology.    
 
6.6.8 Protection system 
The protection system is very important when it comes to the reliability of a system.  
Therefore, when analyzing different failure scenarios and their effect on system reliability 
some basic information on the protection devices used in the power system is needed. Most 
importantly, the protection system defines the systems reaction to given failure situations i.e. 
which components will be disconnected and which parts of the network can still maintain 
operation after failures have occurred.  
Some information about the protection system was made available by Istad Nett and has 
been implemented. However, after an agreement with Istad Nett, it was decided to 
implement standard protection systems if no information was available. Information about 
the Norwegian protection system in general was based on conversations with [7].  
 
Protection system overview:  
▪ Overhead lines and cables  
▫ 22kV-132kV: Single distance protection devices in each termination. 
▫ 300kV-420kV: Double distance protection devices in each termination. 
▪ Transformers (22kV-420kV) 
▫ High voltage side: Differential protection devices and overcurrent protection devices. 
▫ Low voltage side: Distance protection devices. 
▪ All double bus bars with connector switches have differential protection devices. 
▪ The generator sources have no protection.  
 
6.6.9 Failure models  
The various reliability data have been calculated from annual failure statistics released by 
Statnett for 33-420kV networks [30] and experience data from Siemens AS. The derived 
reliability data are listed in appendix 5. The necessary calculations according to [31] have 
been presented in appendix 4.  
The reliability data for the failure model multiple earth faults with multiple outages, is based 
on the failure statistics of the public networks in Germany [12]. Comparing the reliability data 
available in German statistics it is evident that generally the reliability data in Germany are 
25% higher compared to the collected data. This has been taken into consideration and the 
German failure data have been adapted for the Norwegian power system.   
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7 Reliability calculations of Istad Nett 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Some of the most relevant results related to reliability have been presented in this chapter. It 
also includes information about the test cases and the chosen simulation parameters. In 
general, when determining the reliability in a given network a multitude of operation 
scenarios can be tested. However, it clearly has its advantages in this case if the simulations 
first of all reflect real life operating scenarios. Some statistics from the past performance of 
the system is often available and it could be beneficial comparing them to the PSS®SINCAL 
calculation results. In this case, three scenarios related to load expansion have been chosen. 
Further information about the simulation cases, results and description of the various analysis 
methods has also been presented.  
In this context it should be mentioned that the main focus of the presented reliability analysis 
is to give an example of the possibilities that exist in PSS®SINCAL. Thus, emphasizing on the 
reliability methodology. 
 
7.2 Simulation parameters 
7.2.1 General  
The PSS®SINCAL calculation part reads the topological and electric power system data as well 
as the reliability data for the equipment units. The next step involved in the analysis is to 
examine the respective component failure combinations according to the user defined 
simulation parameters. The read data at first are first subject to plausibility and integrity 
checks. Afterwards, the protection zones are determined starting from the error-free 
equipment and protection data. Accordingly, the system is organized into separate 
components. The component failure combinations are generated either by the analytic 
method or by the Monte Carlo simulation.  
 
7.2.2 Relevant failure models 
The following failure models have been chosen part of the reliability calculations: 
▪ Independent single failure  
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▪ Independent unnecessary protection operation  
▪ Common mode  
▪ Unnecessary protection operation with multiple outage  
▪ Multiple earth faults  
 
The failure model describing malfunctioning of protection devices have not been included 
due to lack of statistical data.  
 
7.2.3 Simulation parameters 
Appendix 6 gives an overview of the simulation input parameters both for the calculation and 
analysis part of PSS®SINCAL. ‘Considering the parameters most relevant for the reliability 
results some comments can be made: 
 
▪ Consider only Supply Interruption: This parameter means that PSS®SINCAL does not 
consider failure combinations that do not lead to any power failure of consumers.  
▪ Isolated operating permitted: This parameter defines whether or not the network is 
allowed to break up, leading to island operating scenarios. 
▪ Execution of Switching Operations: Enables the possibility to switch on specific network 
elements during reliability calculations to improve supply security.  
▪ The fields limiting of failure combinations, min. unavailability threshold, min. failure order 
component and max. failure order component; These settings determine if a malfunction 
is considered or not. PSS®SINCAL have the possibility to filter the failure calculations. The 
software does not consider failure combinations with less than minimum unavailability, 
nor does it consider failure combinations as small as the minimum or larger than the 
maximum failure order. 
 
7.2.4 Legend 
Abbreviations commonly used related to the reliability results have been listed.  
   
Reliability indices: 
▪ H: Frequency of supply interruption [1/year]  
▪ T: Average duration of supply interruption [h]  
▪ Q: Non-availability or Probability of supply interruption [min/year]  
▪ L: Interrupted Power [MVA/year]  
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▪ E: Expected energy not supplied (EENS) [MVAh/year]  
▪ K: Cost for energy not supplied (CENS) [NOK/year]  
 
Failure models:  
▪ UN: Independent single failure 
▪ CM: Common-Mode failure 
▪ SV: Malfunction of protection device 
▪ ME: Multiple earth faults  
▪ SUE: Unnecessary protection operation 
▪ SP: Independent unnecessary protection operation 
 
7.3 Test case descriptions 
7.3.1 Overview  
At closer inspection two major industrial areas stand out, which is Nyhamna and 
Hustadmarmor. Nyhamna is the onshore process terminal for the submerged Ormen Lange 
gas field [22]. Hustadmarmor is the world’s biggest producer of pigments for the international 
paper industry [21]. Together, they represent over 50% of the total installed load in the 
system and are under constant development. Istad Nett has provided information about the 
planned load expansion decided to take place over a period of years (see table 7.1-7.3). 
Generally, it is common practice to account for an annual net load growth of about 1% of the 
various loads in a given power system. This load growth has also been included in the three 
test cases, using the base case as a starting point. 
 
7.3.2 Input data 
Bus Load  
Hustadmarmor 93MW 
Nyhamna  135MW 
Remaining load 199.16MW (base case) 
Total load 427.16MW 
Table 7.1 Test case 1: Base case representing year 2008.  
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Bus Load  
Hustadmarmor 101MW 
Nyhamna  210MW 
Remaining load 203.14MW (including two percent growth) 
Total load 514.14MW 
Table 7.2 Test case 2: Load expansion representing year 2010.  
Bus Load  
Hustadmarmor 136MW 
Nyhamna  210MW 
Remaining load 213.1MW (including seven percent growth) 
Total load 559.10MW 
Table 7.3 Test case 3: Load expansion representing year 2015.  
 
7.4 Results  
7.4.1 Overview 
The end result of the reliability analysis is to identify possible weak points/areas in the power 
system that does not have the necessary configuration for an adequately stable and reliable 
operation.  
As mentioned before, PSS®SINCAL has a wide array of possibilities when it comes to 
presenting the results. The possibilities for differentiating the results are especially useful in 
the process of identifying the critical components of the system. The results have been 
presented in the form of quantitative reliability indices, which is the number one tool in the 
process of determining if the various operating scenarios are acceptable or not. Reliability 
indices according to IEEE 1366 have also been included. These reliability indices are SAIDI and 
SAIFI and PSS®SINCAL calculates these indices for all areas of the network.  
The conclusion of the final analysis can e.g. include necessary changes of the network 
topology (e.g. new lines/cables or improving the busbar transfer-capability) and making 
changes to the system power generation (e.g. optimizing the power flow in certain areas). 
The most important results have been presented in appendix 7-13 and further explained in 
the next subchapters.  
The results include reliability indices for the total power system, which is the network model 
in the whole. However, the results from Istad Nett exclude Brandhol, Nyhamna and Grytten 
substation. Other results are related to failure models, the substations, voltage levels and 
relevant system components. 
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All of the statistical data describing disturbances in the Norwegian power system have been 
collected from the annual disturbance statistics made available by NVE (Norges vassdrags- og 
energidirektorat) [26]. 
 
7.4.2 Power system results 
The total power system results have been presented in appendix 7 in the form of reliability 
indices. The results for Istad Nett (total power system excluding Grytten, Nyhamna and 
Brandhol) have also been presented. The results for the total power system indicate an 
annual frequency of supply interruptions of 0.72 with average interruption duration of 3.30 
hours. The results for Istad Nett show an annual frequency of supply interruptions of 0.64 
with average interruption duration of 2.86 hours. These results are related to test case 1. It is 
evident that as the load increases (test case 2 and 3) both the frequency of supply 
interruption and the average interruption duration also increases. These changes, however, 
are very small but the uninterrupted power is now substantially larger causing higher CENS 
costs.  The total CENS cost for the total power system increases from approximately 3.0 
million Norwegian kroner to 4.6 million Norwegian kroner. The total CENS cost for Istad Nett 
increases from approximately 0.95 million Norwegian kroner to 1.4 million Norwegian kroner 
(see figure 7.1). 
 
Figure 7.1 CENS cost Istad Nett AS and total power system. 
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7.4.3 Power system results differentiated according to failure models 
The results differentiated according to the failure models have been presented in appendix 8 
in the form of reliability indices (i.e. the contribution from the various failure models). Figure 
7.2 depicts the results for test case 1.  
 
 
Figure 7.2 Results differentiated according to the failure models. 
The results depicted in figure 7.2 clearly indicate that the highest frequency of supply 
interruptions is caused by independent single failures. However, this doesn’t necessary mean 
that average duration of supply interruption for these failures are longer. Both common mode 
and multiple earth faults failures have the same or longer duration of supply interruption than 
the failures caused by independent single failures i.e. these failures are equally serious 
regarding power system operation. However, the probability for such failures occurring is 
lower, hence the annual ramifications are therefore limited. The energy not delivered directly 
related to these failures is much lower due to the fact that the frequency of supply 
interruptions is lower. The fact that independent single failures are the most common failures 
leading to a supply interruption in the power system is not unexpected as these kinds of 
failures are most likely to occur (supported by the most occurring types of failures in [26]).  
Regarding the failure model, independent unnecessary protection operation, it is evident that 
scenarios leading to such failures have a relatively high probability compared to the other 
failure models, which is to be expected. From experience these failures are often caused by 
human error (work related errors causing unwanted disconnections) and are very common. 
This is supported by [30] which rank human error second on the list of disturbances 
differentiated according to cause.  
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7.4.4 Results differentiated according to voltage level  
The results for the different voltage levels have been presented in appendix 9 in the form of 
reliability indices. Examining the results for the different voltage levels it is important to 
remember that the 132kV network results actually reflect the 22kV network results. This is 
also the case for the 420kV network results, which reflect the 132kV network results. The 
reason for this is the fact that PSS®SINCAL calculates the reliability indices for the load nodes 
i.e. where the supply interruptions occur. Thus, the reliability in the 420kV and 132kV 
networks will in fact be related to supply interruptions in the 132kV and 22kV networks (i.e. 
supply interruptions in 420kV and 132kV networks are related to failures in the 132kV and 
22kV network). The lower voltage levels (1-22kV) are not included as the components at 
these voltage levels have been regarded as 100% reliable. It should also be mentioned that in 
this case the reliability of the 420kV network is actually the reliability of Nyhamna substation 
since this is the only 132kV load in the system. One could therefore argue that the reliability 
indices for the 420kV network are not directly comparable to annual statistics such as in [26] 
but have been included for demonstrative purposes.  
Statistically the number of interruptions and especially the duration of the interruptions are 
higher at 132kV and lower than in the upper voltage levels. The reason for this is that many 
substations at the 132 kV levels operate on a single line. The substations at 420kV levels are 
however often more interconnected. This secures a more reliable operation and also 
decreases the frequency of supply interruptions and the average duration of the 
interruptions. This is supported by [26] that states that only about 3% of all failures leading to 
a supply interruption actually occurs in the 420kV networks. The results presented in 
appendix 9 supports this. The numbers of supply interruptions at the lower voltage levels are 
approximately 0.7 annual interruptions compared to the 420kV voltage level at 0.2 annual 
interruptions. However, for the 420kV voltage level this is just an approximation due to the 
insufficient statistical information mentioned above.  
Generally, it is also important to remember that the ramifications of failures in the 420kV 
network are much higher compared to the lower voltage levels. So, even tough the frequency 
of supply interruption is lower at 420kV voltage level than e.g. at a 22kV voltage level, it 
doesn’t necessarily mean that the reliability is better at this voltage level.   
 
7.4.5 Results differentiated according to substations   
The results for the substations have been presented in appendix 10 in the form of reliability 
indices. The results have been differentiated in accordance to the annual CENS cost which is 
the most important reliability indicator for the utilities. Figure 7.3 depicts the five substations 
contributing to the highest CENS costs related to test case 1.  
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Figure 7.3 Results differentiated according to the failure models. 
The two major contributions related to CENS cost is the substations Nyhamna and 
Hustadmarmor. This is to be expected since the majority of load is connected to these 
substations. The topology of the Nyhamna station makes it vulnerable as it is connected to 
the main grid through one cable only. Hustadmarmor, on the other hand, is connected via 
two cables, heightening the level of redundancy and improving the reliability.  
Eidseter substation has a much higher frequency of supply interruptions than both Nyhamna 
and Hustadmarmor but the total connected load is substantially smaller, which is reflected in 
the annual CENS cost. The frequency of supply interruption at this station is 0.32, which is 
high compared to the other stations. The reason for this is the lack of a sufficient protection 
system (station only equipped with disconnectors not circuit-breakers). At closer inspection, it 
is clear that failures on the lines connecting Eidseter with Istad and Årødal will in fact lead to a 
total disconnection of the Eidseter substation. Both distance protection systems (protecting 
Årødal and Istad) will react to such failures.   
 
7.4.6 Component oriented results  
The component oriented results have been presented in appendix 11 and 12 in the form of 
reliability indices. Component oriented results can be very beneficial in the process of 
identifying critical components in the power system. This information may act as an incentive 
for future investments improving the power system reliability and hence the power transfer 
capability.   
Figure 7.4 depicts the results for test case 1 and depicts some of the components in the test 
system differentiated according to the frequency of supply interruptions.  
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Figure 7.4 Component oriented results differentiated according to frequency of supply interruptions. 
The results, as to be expected, show that independent single failures on the overhead lines of 
the system have the highest frequency of supply interruptions.  
Test case 3 represent the potential load situation year 2015 and represent the worst-case 
scenario related to CENS cost.  Figure 7.5 depicts the results for test case 3.  
 
 
Figure 7.5 Component oriented results differentiated according to CENS cost. 
The results show that independent single failures on the cable connecting the substation 
Nyhamna with the substation Fræna gives the highest isolated CENS cost. The reasons for this 
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are both related to the power system topology and the high load connected to this station. 
Nyhamna substation is connected to Fræna (the link to the main power system) through one 
cable, making it particularly vulnerable to failures leading to disconnections. Taking this into 
consideration, combined with the fact that the larges connected load is being fed from this 
station, one could conclude that this is a major weak-point in the system. However, in this 
case the off-shore cable between Nyhamna and Fræna has unfortunately been modeled as an 
overhead line due to lack of data. This of course needs to be taken into consideration as 
experience show that cables are less failure affected. Off-shore cables sometimes inhabit 
back-up systems enabling power transfer at failure system, which also would have a positive 
affect on the reliability.     
Appendix 13 show some results from which components that contributes to the highest 
duration of supply interruption. From the results it is evident that failures involving the 
system transformers give higher outage duration than e.g. failures on the overhead lines. This 
is plausible since failures on transformers often require time consuming revisions, compared 
to overhead lines, which in many cases can be directly re-connected.       
PSS®SINCAL enables several other component oriented results to be collected but they have 
not been included in the thesis. The main goal is to give an example of a reliability analysis 
emphasizing the reliability methodology.     
 
7.4.7 Reliability indices according to IEEE 1366 standard 
The results for the IEEE 1366 indices have been presented in appendix 14. However, in this 
case only the indices that can be calculated by PSS®SINCAL have been included. These indices 
have only been included for demonstrative purposes as the test system doesn’t have any 
defined areas that could be comparable to other systems. However, these indices are very 
beneficial regarding large power systems with defined areas such as e.g. the different 
counties and voltage levels. Such information is comparable to annual statistics such as in 
[26].  
 
7.5 Conclusion  
Appendix 7-13 presents an overview of some of the most important reliability results 
differentiated according to the total power system, failure models, substations, voltage levels 
and components. The reliability indices give an indication of the reliability of Istad Nett. 
However, several uncertainties related to the analysis must be taken into consideration. In the 
latter, the quality of the statistical reliability data, describing the network components is very 
important. The analysis is based on reliability data derived from annual disturbance statistics 
and may or may not be directly comparable to the statistics related to Istad Nett. The 
statistical data available covers all types of network topologies i.e. not necessarily 
representative of the type of network under examination. 
It is evident, from the results, that the planned load development will affect the reliability of 
the power system and potentially increase the frequency of supply interruptions causing 
higher CENS costs. However, this is not the case as the changes in frequency of supply 
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interruptions are very small. The reason for the increased CENS cost is due to the fact that the 
uninterrupted power is now substantially larger. Thus, the small change in the frequency of 
supply interruption seen from test case 1 to test case 3 indicates high level of reliability even 
with the planned load expansion. 
Off course, the most important questions still remains unanswered; what is reliability of the 
power system and is it possible to identify the potential critical elements? Answering these 
questions are not easy because in order to determine the reliability levels reference points 
need to be established for comparative analysis. These reference points can e.g. be reliability 
indices obtained from statistical data. Such statistical data can be found in [26, 30] which 
contain information about annual disturbances reported in the Norwegian power grid. The 
problem with this is that the statistics are derived from all disturbances at voltage levels from 
1kV to 420kV. The network model and the corresponding reliability results obtained from the 
analysis only include failures at 132kV voltage levels. Since the number of occurring failures 
at 22kV greatly excides the number of failures at 132kV it could be argued that the available 
statistics are to pessimistic and therefore not comparable. However, as stated before the main 
emphasis has been the methodology describing the reliability.  
The given test system and the performed reliability calculation demonstrates PSS®SINCAL as a 
tool for determining the reliability of a power system. The methodology utilized in this report 
is from the author’s point of view a good representation of a state of the art reliability 
analysis.  
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8 Criticality  
8.1 Introduction  
The work performed in this master thesis deals with the reliability of a given power system. In 
the latter, it is important to remember that some of the results presented in the previous 
chapters clearly have a limited relevance regarding operation and network planning. This is 
due to the fact that the results are more or less, representing the network model and not 
necessary the real-life power system. In fact, several factors need to be included if the results 
can be compared.  
 
These factors can include:  
▪ Quality of reliability data 
▪ Modeling accuracy 
▪ Computer software limitations 
▪ Relevant failure modeling 
  
However, the above mentioned factors are more or less related to the reliability calculation 
process and not the actual analysis of the results. So, in order to support decisions related to 
power system development, it is necessary to develop indices that would be helpful in further 
analyses and decision making processes. This analysis is of course based on the assumption 
that the reliability calculations are correct (i.e. the above mentioned factors are within 
acceptable limits). In the latter, methodologies identifying the criticality both for substation 
and component are necessary. The following chapter presents an example of how this could 
be made possible by utilizing methods developed for preventative maintenance. The 
presented proposal describing a criticality methodology concludes some of the work 
presented in [28, 29].  
 
8.2 Methodology describing criticality 
The number one tool in the determination of the system criticality, utilizing the described 
method, is the consequence matrix. Table 8.1 shows an example of such a matrix with the 
given levels of probability and consequence. The green and yellow cells represent acceptable 
situations and the red cell represents a situation that requires risk reducing measures. 
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 Consequence 
Probability / frequency Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Level 1 3 4 5 
Level 2 2 3 4 
Level 3 1 2 3 
Level 4 0 1 2 
Table 8.1 Criticality consequence matrix.     
If this method is to be successful, the development of the consequence matrix needs to be 
defined by the customer (e.g. the utilities). What this means is that both the probability levels 
and the consequence levels have to be defined in accordance to what the customer desires.  
The probability can e.g. be the number of failures or types of failures leading to supply 
interruptions having different impact on the system (e.g. in relation to CENS cost). Several 
aspects related to the levels consequence need to be taken into consideration and not just the 
CENS cost.  
 
Other consequence measures could be:  
▪ Human safety (e.g. what is the level of danger involved at a given failure). 
▪ Laws and regulations (control of the power system beyond the normal power demand 
criteria). 
▪ Special agreements (e.g. higher level of supply reliability for important customers). 
 
These are all examples of other consequence matrixes which can be taken into consideration 
when determining the actual consequence of a given failure/operating scenario.  
The next step is to determine the criticality for each of e.g. the components, network areas or 
substations according to the consequence matrix. Finally, the chosen components violating 
given criticality thresholds determined be the customer can be identified. This information 
could then work as an incentive for alternative courses of actions improving the reliability.  
The following subchapter describes an example of how the implantation of a consequence 
matrix could be used in the process of identifying critical components in the PSS®SINCAL test 
case. 
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8.3 Criticality of the network described in the test case 
8.3.1 Introduction 
As part of the determination of the criticality, most importantly, the consequence matrix 
needs to be defined. In this case the probability levels have been described by the frequency 
of supply interruptions index available from the PSS®SINCAL reliability analysis (test case 3). 
The consequence levels have been divided into three groups (S, M and L) and are related to 
the actual estimated CENS cost.  
 
The consequences are as follows:  
▪ S: CENS cost: K < 100 000 NOK 
▪ M: CENS cost: 100 000 NOK < K < 500 000 NOK 
▪ L: CENS cost:  K < 500 000 NOK 
 
The probabilities are as follows:  
▪ Very likely occurrence: H > 0.2 
▪ Likely occurrence: 0.1 < H < 0.2 
▪ Not very likely occurrence: H < 0.1 
▪ Unlikely situation: H = 0 
 
This only serves as an example and the values describing the probability and the consequence 
levels are fictive values. 
 
8.3.2 Criticality 
Table 8.2 is the consequence matrix defining the criticality (probability * consequence) for 
the test case substations. 
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 Consequence 
Probability S M L 
Very likely occurrence  3 4 5 
Likely occurrence 2 3 4 
Not very likely occurrence 1 2 3 
Unlikely situation 0 1 2 
Table 8.2 Criticality consequence matrix related to CENS cost.     
The results from test case 3 have been subject to investigation and the criticality in 
accordance to the consequence matrix has been listed in the table below (table 8.3).  
 
Substation H [1/a]  K [NOK] Criticality 
Brandhol 0.03205599 3957.93 S1 
Nyhamna  0.21114582 3154374.25 L5 
Hauglia 0.02703738 21311.18 S1 
Fræna 0.03365767 10324.83 S1 
Eidseter 0.32283068 304434.84 M4 
Bolli 0.11052679 136748.89 M3 
Hustad 0.07413208 721606.38 L3 
Moldeli 0.04509064 106206.45 M1 
Grytten 0.03619903 26090.31 S1 
Table 8.3 Substation criticality related to test case 3.     
Table 8.4 shows the substations violating a given criticality thresholds (e.g. all substations 
with the criticality from L2-L4) have been identified. This is also just an approximation and an 
example of a criticality threshold. However, the level of consequence between L2-L4 
identifies the two substations previously estimated to give the highest CENS cost. 
 
Critical substation (L3 – L5) Criticality 
Hustad  L3 
Nyhamna L5 
Table 8.4 Critical substations.     
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Table 8.5 has been included for demonstrative purposes and it shows an example of how one 
could determine the criticality of a given substation. In this case, the circuit breakers have 
been considered and the criticality has been calculated from the same defined consequence 
matrix given in table 8.2. From this example it is evident that from the defined consequence 
matrix, the circuit breaker Q2 could be the reason for the high criticality rating of the 
substation Nyhamna (table 8.5). 
 
Circuit breaker (example) Criticality (example) 
-Q1 S2 
-Q2 L5 
-Q3 S1 
-Q4 M3 
Table 8.5 Example of the criticality related the circuit breakers of Nyhamna substation.     
Finally, alternative courses of action can be purposed, with the end result of improving both 
the circuit breaker and the substation criticality.  
 
Such improvement, in this case, could be:  
▪ Overhauling the circuit breaker. 
▪ Replacing the circuit breaker. 
▪ Revision of the control system. 
 
This component orientated criticality system can also be utilized for other substation 
components such as transformers, lines, cables etc.  
 
8.3.3 Procedure determining the criticality  
As mentioned the criticality analysis often include other factors equally or more important 
than CENS cost. Both human safety and laws and regulations are factors that potentially have 
a greater affect on the criticality. Take human safety for example; if a certain failure are likely 
to cause human injuries, it of course doesn’t matter if the CENS cost is low. This is also the 
case related to laws and regulations; if a certain failure are likely to violate statutory laws, it of 
course doesn’t matter if the CENS cost is low. These are all factors that need to be taken into 
consideration. In the latter, it is necessary to establish a predefined procedure for interpreting 
the criticality results.  
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Including human safety 
Let say the utility whish to implement human safety to the criticality analysis, then a second 
matrix need to be included (table 8.6). 
  
 Consequence 
Probability S M L 
Very likely occurrence  3 4 5 
Likely occurrence 2 3 4 
Not very likely occurrence 1 2 3 
Unlikely situation 0 1 2 
Table 8.6 Criticality consequence matrix related to human safety.     
The consequences are now as follows:  
▪ S: No danger of human injuries.  
▪ M: Possible human injuries.  
▪ L: Human injuries (death or permanent impairment). 
 
The probabilities as before:  
▪ Very likely occurrence: H > 0.2 
▪ Likely occurrence: 0.1 < H < 0.2 
▪ Not very likely occurrence: H < 0.1 
▪ Unlikely situation: H = 0 
 
This extended criticality analysis now include two matrixes, one related to CENS cost and the 
other related to human safety, affecting the procedure describing the criticality. The criteria 
for preventative interventions now consist of both the consequences.  
 
Example of a simple procedure describing criticality:  
▪ Human safety criticalities rated from M3-L5 (regardless of the CENS cost criticality) are not 
acceptable and preventative interventions must be put into action.  
▪ CENS cost criticalities rated from L2-L5 are not acceptable and preventative interventions 
must be put into action.  
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Including Laws and regulations 
Let say human safety is not an issue but the utility are heavily regulated, then a second matrix 
including the e.g. special agreements can be included (table 8.7). 
 
 Consequence 
Probability S M L 
Very likely occurrence  3 4 5 
Likely occurrence 2 3 4 
Not very likely occurrence 1 2 3 
Unlikely situation 0 1 2 
Table 8.7 Criticality consequence matrix related to laws and regulation.     
The consequences are now as follows:  
▪ S: No special customer interruption (no fines). 
▪ M: Partial special customer interruption (small fines). 
▪ L: No power transfer to special customers (large fines).  
 
The probabilities as before:  
▪ Very likely occurrence: H > 0.2 
▪ Likely occurrence: 0.1 < H < 0.2 
▪ Not very likely occurrence: H < 0.1 
▪ Unlikely situation: H = 0 
 
This extended criticality analysis now include two matrixes, one related to CENS cost and the 
other related to special customer agreements, affecting the procedure describing the 
criticality. The criteria for preventative interventions now consist of both the consequences.  
 
Example of a simple procedure describing criticality:  
▪ CENS cost criticalities rated at M3-L3 are not acceptable and preventative interventions 
must be put into action as long as the special agreement criticality is rated from L4-L5. 
▪ CENS cost criticalities rated from L4-L5 are not acceptable and preventative interventions 
must be put into action regardless of the special agreement criticality.  
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8.4 Conclusion 
The motivation for including this chapter is to show a methodology for determining the 
power system criticality i.e. the process of identifying the critical system components. As 
shown, the main tool is the consequence matrix, which categories the results obtained from 
the reliability analysis. The categories indicate both the consequence and the probability 
levels. The procedure of producing the consequence matrix is a challenging task, since it 
often not only includes CENS cost, as in the previously described example. Factors such as 
human safety, special agreements and laws and operational regulations are examples of 
other possible factors. Such matrixes need to be the result of a joint effort from both the 
customer and the professionals performing the criticality analysis, including all relevant 
information needed to classify criticality.  
It should be pointed out that the work involved clearly depends on the level of accuracy. In 
theory, the consequence matrix could be utilized in categorizing all of the system 
components. However, this would result in a very time consuming process. The strength of 
this method lies in the fact that the defined probabilities doesn’t change. Thus, it can be used 
to identify large elements, such as substations, and then be further utilized on a component 
level for the critical substation. Finally, the predefined procedures classify levels of criticality. 
Hopefully evoking substantial effort from the utilities to deal with the critical parts of their 
power system, thereby improving the reliability based on both safety and a financial point of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Page 73 of 103 
9  Discussion 
9.1 Limitations related to reliability analysis 
9.1.1 Average failure frequency  
Recent customer surveys related to interruption costs show that the cost per interruption has 
a considerable variation with the time of occurrence of interruptions. Analyses of available 
data from failure statistics verify this and show similar variations in failure rate and repair 
duration. Time dependent load variations are well known and have been included in the test 
model describes in the previous chapters. However, it is evident that time dependencies such 
as average failure frequency may affect the annual number of interruptions and interruption 
costs for delivery points. In the latter, one could argue that the average time dependent 
failure frequency should be taken into consideration when conducting reliability analysis as 
described in this thesis. 
The subject of reliability analysis and the time dependencies of relevant input data are under 
on-going work and development. The information presented in this chapter is part of recent 
work in relation to the PhD presented in [27]. The presented work describes a modeling 
approach, which include all types of failures e.g. caused by weather, technical, or humans. 
The idea is to use observed failure rate patterns shaped by all types of failures mentioned 
above implementing them into a new and improved model for describing the power system.  
Such average failure frequency modeling has clear advantages and gives a more accurate 
reliability model. However, such information has not been included in the PSS®SINCAL model 
as the motivation is to demonstrate the methodology for reliability calculations. Also, such 
detailed statistical data from Istad Nett AS are unobtainable. 
 
9.1.2 Exponential distribution 
Another important aspect of the reliability analysis is the limitations of the exponential 
distribution models often used in these kinds of analysis. The exponential distribution models 
the behavior of the system components in such a way that they fail at a constant rate, 
regardless of the accumulated age. The work performed in [25] states that this property 
greatly simplifies the analysis, making the distribution inappropriate for most reliability 
analyses, because it does not apply to most real world applications. All power system 
components will wear out over time and hence not inhabit a constant failure rate. This may 
result in reliability estimates that are too low in the early stages of life and too high in later 
stages.  
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PSS®SINCAL does enable the possibility to model specific component life cycles. However, this 
is soli related the utilized input data and need to be analyzed according to chosen periods. For 
example, if the performance of a certain circuit breaker in known to worsen over a period of 
time, this can be taken into consideration by modifying the statistical input data including 
two operating scenarios. One is representing the early stages of “life” and the other 
representing the worsened case. The problem with such modeling is the availability of input 
data describing different stages of life, which is very difficult to obtain.  
Although the exponential distributed failure rate it is not applicable to most real world 
applications, the use of the exponential distribution still has some value to reliability analysis. 
The distribution can be effectively incorporated into reliability analysis if the constant failure 
rate assumption can be justified, which all depends on the scope and degree of accuracy of 
the reliability analysis. The work performed in [25] states that one should not underestimate 
the exponential distribution’s contribution to the development of current reliability theory. 
However, today’s high product reliability goals require the use of more sophisticated analysis 
methods and metrics that more accurately reflect real world conditions. Such models have 
been developed and computer technology addresses the more complex mathematical 
formulations they require. 
 
9.2 Some aspects concerning the quality of reliability data 
9.2.1 Introduction  
The core in any reliability analysis is the statistical data describing the behavior of a power 
system. If the reliability calculations are to be successful it is essential that the reliability data 
corresponds to the power system subject for testing. As previously stated; the process of 
obtaining vital information about the power system performance is important as it is part of 
the process of determining the future behavior of the system. 
This chapter deals with some of the aspects related to the reliability data and the reliability 
failure models. In the latter, the quality of available input data has been empathized and 
further discussed.  
The quality of any reliability analysis is highly dependent on the quality of the available 
reliability data and several factors could potentially influence the analysis. However, the 
accuracy and the comprehensiveness (i.e. the total number of disturbances) of the statistical 
data play an important role. This is evident when comparing e.g. failure models such as 
independent single failure and malfunction of a protection device. Closer inspection of these 
failure modes reveal that the total number of independent single failures greatly excides the 
number of malfunctioning of protection devices. This clearly poses as a challenge as the 
number of malfunctioning protection devices is very low i.e. resulting in a higher statistical 
uncertainty. The process of determining the actual sequence of events leading to unwanted 
operations of a protection system is complex. Such failures often include secondary 
equipment or software related issues. In the latter, high quality data representing protection 
system failures are much harder to obtain than let say an independent single failure caused 
by a lightning strike. The failure models representing the system protection devices have 
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therefore been further discussed. Some information about the utilization of outage duration 
and time of repair has also been included.   
 
9.2.2 Failure models 
As mentioned above, failure models related to protection systems have the potential to 
include uncertainties in the process of determining the reliability of a given power system.  
PSS®SINCAL enables the use of three different protection system failure models, which are:  
▪ Malfunction of protection device  
▪ Unnecessary protection operation with multiple outage 
▪ Independent unnecessary protection operation  
 
These failure models give a good representation of possible failures related to protection 
systems, but as demonstrated throughout this thesis, they are highly dependent on statistical 
input data, which need to be taken into consideration.  
 
Potential sources for incorrect reliability data:  
▪ Low number of occurrences.  
▪ Inaccurate failure registration.  
 
9.2.3 Outage duration and time of repair 
Figure 9.1 depicts an example of the utilization of outage duration and time of repair. In 
terms of registration of disturbances and reliability analysis, outage durations need to be 
discussed.  
 
Figure 9.1 Component oriented results differentiated according to CENS cost. 
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The outage duration is defined as the total time from component failure, t=0 until restoration, 
t4.  Repair time, however, only includes the actual work-related period of time e.g. from t1-t2 
and t3-t4 and therefore could be misleading regarding the performance / reliability of a power 
system or components. The problem today is that there is no collective procedure regarding 
the registration of the total outage period. The reasons are more or less related to individual 
practice and existing disagreements. Regarding the gathering of statistical data it is important 
to remember that some of the outage times may reflect the actual time it took to repair the 
component and not the actual interruption time period.  
Failures leading to interruptions and disconnections of components are not always severe and 
in some cases the failure affected component can be up and running followed by a later 
repair. In this case the time of repair doesn’t reflect the performance of the component. 
Another example is the possibility of alternative redundant or backup systems that can 
maintain the power transfer after a given failure. The time of repair compared to the actual 
outage time in this situation can differ drastically. In the latter, it is important to be some 
what skeptical to statistical data and take this into consideration i.e. disregarding events with 
extremely long outage duration or time of repair.  Again this emphasizes the importance of 
close corporation with the utilities in the process of selecting correct reliability data.    
 
9.2.4 Conclusion 
Considering the test model utilized in this report, one could argue that the reliability data 
collected from a variety of different parts of the Norwegian power system, reflects the 
performance of the test system pessimistically. The main reason for this assumption is the 
fact that the utilized statistics cover disturbances at all network topologies and therefore not 
necessarily a good representation of a given test network. In this case, the network test 
model is based on a highly interconnected and very reliable distribution system. Istad Nett 
states that failures very seldom occur supporting the above stated. This only demonstrate the 
importance of high quality statistical data and also the fact that local statistical data e.g. data 
based on local knowledge or local statistics in many cases pose as a better solution. However, 
such data are unfortunately often very difficult to obtain, leaving no alternative as to use the 
available more general data. The question is; will the data have an optimistic or pessimistic 
affect on the results compared to the actual performance of the power system under 
investigation? These uncertainties will always exist and need to be taken into consideration. 
However, close cooperation with the utilities in combination with the utilization of high 
quality reliability data will after my opinion have a positive affect on the accuracy of the 
reliability analysis.  
 
9.3 Comparing PSS®SINCAL and SAMREL 
9.3.1 Introduction  
As demonstrated throughout this report the various aspects comprising a probabilistic 
reliability analysis can be both challenging and complex. This in mind, it is always beneficial 
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to examine other developed methods and tools related to reliability. The motivation for 
including this chapter is the fact that a comparison between a commercialized and highly 
developed tool such as PSS®SINCAL and the newly developed tool SAMREL could be 
beneficial. The main focus has been the reliability methodology.    
 
9.3.2 Reliability analysis 
SAMREL utilize the known power planning software PSSE in the power flow calculations and 
compared to PSS®SINCAL there is not actually any differences. Both PSSE and PSS®SINCAL 
utilize standard methods in the process of determining the power system power flow. In the 
latter, the main difference lies in the selection of operational states. The EMPS model in 
SAMREL provide a set of production and load scenarios including the given transmission 
capacities. Then, the necessary constraints and limits (e.g. voltages, thermal rating, voltage 
stability and angular stability) are checked. Through this iterative process the realistic 
transmission capacities as well as the feasible operational states are found as input to the 
next step of the analysis. Contingency analysis then investigates the affect on the system at 
each of the selected operating states. This process is some what similar in PSS®SINCAL the 
only difference is the process of selecting these operational states. PSS®SINCAL simulates all 
possible failure combinations (Poisson distributed) above certain probability threshold. All 
failure combinations not in violation of this probability are then subjected to power flow 
calculations determining the affect on the system. The end result is the same as in SAMREL, a 
set of failure combinations leading to supply interruptions. 
The final part is the calculation of the reliability indices describing the power system 
reliability. In the reliability analysis the objective is to determine the reliability of supply 
indices for the delivery points under study, i.e. to estimate the frequency and duration of 
interruptions, energy not supplied and the corresponding cost of energy not supply (CENS). 
For this purpose, SAMREL and PSS®SINCAL utilize either an analytic approach or Monte Carlo 
simulations. The strength of SAMREL compared to PSS®SINCAL is the time-varying parameters 
methodology which estimates the time of the occurrences (Year, month and day, hour). The 
methodology also includes the expected load, the expected duration and the expected 
specific interruption cost when the interruption occurs. A model which is able to generate this 
pattern, analytically or by simulation, will therefore produce outage events according to what 
is expected to happen in the real system. Time-dependent correlations such as this can also 
be included in PSS®SINCAL. However, this requires the analysis of various periods individually. 
Meaning, conducting a reliability analysis based on statistical data from a specific month of 
week, which evidently is more time consuming.  
 
9.3.3 Conclusion 
Comparing tools describing probabilistic reliability are important and can act as an incentive 
for future development. PSS®SINCAL and SAMREL are more or less based on the same 
methodology and one would therefore assume equal reliability results. The problem is that 
SAMREL is still under development and a working software demo is not available. This pose as 
a major draw-back as a comparative analysis of both the tools relates to the same test model 
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would have been very beneficial. Other processes such as network/component modeling, 
power flow simulations, failure models and result presentation are more or less the same in 
both tools.  
SAMREL is comprised of several existing tools and therefore rely on the interaction between 
these tools, which after my opinion further complicate both the user friendliness and process 
of commercialization. This interacting requires a tool that can handle the processes (e.g. 
import and export) between the various tools described in the SAMREL methodology. The 
strength of SAMREL is the highly developed methods for including time-varying parameters 
and time-dependent correlations between them for each delivery point. SAMREL divides the 
statistical material into appropriate groups distributing the failure rate over a given time-
period, resulting in a model describing the outage events according to what is expected to 
happen in the real system. The major strength of PSS®SINCAL compared to SAMREL is simply 
the fact that PSS®SINCAL is an available highly developed commercialized tool. PSS®SINCAL is 
a compact solution and therefore doesn’t depend on other tools. Seen from an economical 
(one license) point-of-view, this is also a good argument.   
One aspect however remains; the methodology described in SAMREL can not yet be put to 
the test, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that the work performed is useless. The work on 
the reliability module ZUBER, now part of PSS®SINCAL started in the 80’s at the Darmstadt 
University of Technology and the Saarland University. However, commercialization has led to 
a more hidden development of the reliability methodology, making it harder to obtain 
detailed information about PSS®SINCAL. SAMREL on the other hand, is developed at SINTEF 
energy research with close cooperation from the Norwegian university of technology and 
science and the utilities. From an educational point-of-view, this has several benefits and has 
contributed to increase the general knowledge about power system reliability.  
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10 Conclusion 
10.1 Introduction  
The work presented in this report concludes the master thesis work preformed at the 
Norwegian university of science and technology part of the international master program; 
master of science in electric power engineering. The study deals with probabilistic reliability 
calculations and the development of network test case model. In the latter, both reliability 
calculations, comparing available tools and literature studies have been performed with the 
sole purpose of describing a state of the art reliability methodology. This methodology 
includes all of the steps involved in a reliability analysis and for demonstrative purposes 
includes an example from a real-life power system (Istad). This chapter gives an overview of 
the most important results, challenges and conclusions.    
 
10.2 Challenges 
Regarding reliability calculations several aspects related to the utilization, purpose and degree 
of importance have been discussed throughout this report. The core in any reliability analysis, 
except the actual tools, is the statistical data describing the power system performance. It is 
critical that this information is of sufficient quality and give a good representation of the 
network components and possible failure situations. Unfortunately, dealing with statistical 
data some uncertainties always exist and must be taken into consideration.  
Uncertainties related to reliability data however are in many cases negligible, which all 
depend on the scope of the analysis. Consider e.g. a detailed study of a given power system 
and its components compared to a general study of the Norwegian regional power system. 
Both studies require statistical data, but it is evident that the detailed power station analysis 
require higher quality data if the results is to be trustworthy. It is evident that more detailed 
reliability studies require close cooperation with the owner of the power station, were more 
general statistics can serve as a starting point. The challenge is to be aware of these 
limitations including them in the analysis process.   
 
10.3 Utilization of reliability calculations  
Even tough some uncertainties dealing with computer based simulations are present, the 
probabilistic reliability analysis serves as an excellent tool working with power system 
operation and development.  
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The areas of applications include:  
▪ Quantification of the quality of supply. 
▫ System level reliability. 
▫ End-user reliability. 
▪ Documentation of expected power system reliability.  
▪ Analysis related to different network topologies.  
▫ N-1 topologies. 
▫ Load scenarios. 
▫ Power system configuration.  
▪ Decision-making processes.  
▫ Incentive for development.  
▫ Incentive for operation.  
▪ Identification of criticality.  
▫ Components. 
▫ Failure models.  
▪ Preventative maintenance. 
▫ Identify critical components. 
 
10.4 State of the art description 
Generally, the core of any reliability analysis consists of four corner stones, the model, 
statistical data, reliability calculation tools and assessment. These subjects have all been 
thoroughly dealt with through literature studies and the development of the test case model. 
In the latter, PSS®SINCAL and its reliability module ZUBER were emphasized representing a 
state of the art description of such analysis methods. 
 
10.4.1 Reliability model 
Regardless of the analysis methods, the system under consideration has to be represented in 
a model suitable for probabilistic reliability analysis. Classic methods like power flow and 
short-circuit calculations require standard topological and electric characteristics of the power 
system equipment and its components. Reliability calculations on the other hand require 
statistical data describing the system. Reliability analysis deals with a systems ability to restore 
supply after being subjected to various disturbances. Therefore, redundancy i.e. switching 
possibilities and protection systems configurations needed to be included in the model. The 
process of establishing the network model has been presented in chapter 6.   
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10.4.2 Reliability data 
The core in any reliability analysis is the statistical data describing the behavior of a power 
system. If the reliability calculations are to be successful it is essential that the reliability data 
corresponds to the power system subject for testing. As previously stated; the process of 
obtaining vital information about the power system performance is important as it is part of 
the process of determining the future behavior of the system. The various reliability data have 
been calculated from annual failure statistics collected by Statnett and experience data from 
Siemens AS.  
 
10.4.3 Reliability calculations 
The reliability calculations have been performed utilizing the PSS®SINCAL methodology. This 
method is based on the past performance of the actual system i.e. the statistical reliability 
input data. Component outages and corresponding input data for the failure models are 
derived from appropriate outage statistics. Contingency analysis generates states or failure 
combinations using stochastic methods. These states are then analyzed for their effect on the 
customers, regarding reliability of supply. In case of supply interruptions, the complete 
sequence of events until restoration of supply to all customers or until the temporal 
expiration of the failure combination is also modeled. Finally, the probabilistic reliability 
indices for the system and for each customer are calculated. The PSS®SINCAL methodology 
has been described in chapter 4 and chapter 6.   
 
10.4.4 Analysis / assessment 
As previously mentioned PSS®SINCAL has a wide array of possibilities when it comes to 
presenting the results. The possibilities for differentiating the results are especially useful in 
the process of identifying the critical components of the system. The results have been 
presented in the form of quantitative reliability indices. These indices are the number one tool 
in the process of deciding if the selected operating situations are acceptable or not. Results 
have been differentiated according to failure models, substations, voltage levels and relevant 
system components. The results also include indices related to the total power system and 
the part of the network owned by Istad Nett AS. It is of the author’s opinion that these results 
are diverse, severing as good indicators of the power system reliability at various levels.  The 
results and assessments have been described in chapter 7.   
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10.5 Reliability calculations of Istad Nett 
It is evident, from the results, that the planned load development will affect operation of the 
power system and potentially increase the frequency of supply interruptions causing higher 
CENS costs. However, this is not the case as the changes in frequency of supply interruptions 
are very small. The reason for the higher CENS cost is due to the fact that the uninterrupted 
power is now substantially larger. Thus, the small change in the frequency of supply 
interruption seen from test case 1 to test case 3 indicates high level of reliability even with 
the planned load expansion. 
Off course, the most important questions still remains unanswered; what is reliability of the 
power system and is it possible to identify the potential critical elements? Answering these 
questions are not easy because in order to determine the reliability levels one need to 
establish reference points for comparative analysis. These reference points can e.g. be 
reliability indices obtained from statistical data. Such statistical data can be found in [26] 
which contain information about annual disturbances reported in the Norwegian power grid. 
The problem is that the statistics are derived from all disturbances at voltage levels from 1kV 
to 420kV. The network model and the corresponding reliability results obtained from the 
analysis only include failures at 132kV voltage levels. Since the number of occurring failures 
at 22kV greatly excides the number of failures at 132kV on could argue that the available 
statistics are to pessimistic and therefore not comparable.  
Some low probability “special” failure combinations may not have been detected in the 
reliability analysis. This should be taken into consideration as some unlikely situations could 
lead to critical CENS costs.  However, as previously stated the main emphasis has been the 
methodology describing the reliability.  
The given test system and the performed reliability calculation demonstrates PSS®SINCAL as a 
tool for determining the reliability of a power system. The methodology utilized in this report 
is from the author’s point of view a good representation of a state of the art reliability 
analysis.  
 
10.6 Criticality  
The motivation for including this chapter is to show a methodology for determining the 
power system criticality i.e. the process of identifying the critical system components. As 
shown, the main tool is the consequence matrix, which categories the results obtained from 
the reliability analysis. The categories indicate both the consequence and the probability. 
Producing the consequence matrix can pose as a challenging task since it often not only 
includes CENS cost as in the previously described example (e.g. factors such as human safety, 
special agreements and laws and operational regulations). Such matrixes need to be the 
result of a joint effort from both the customer and the professionals performing the criticality 
analysis, including all relevant information needed to classify criticality. It should be pointed 
out that the work involved clearly depends on the level of accuracy. In theory, the 
consequence matrix could be used to categories all of the system components. However, this 
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would result in a very time consuming process. The strength of this method lies in the fact 
that the defined probabilities doesn’t change. Thus, it can be used to identify large elements, 
such as substations and then be further utilized on a component level for the critical 
substation, as shown in the previous example. Finally, the predefined procedures classify 
levels of criticality. Hopefully evoking substantial effort from the utilities to deal with the 
critical parts of their power system, thereby improving the reliability based on both safety and 
a financial point of view.  
 
10.7 Future work  
For future work, I would first of all recommend a closer reliability study using the methods 
describes in this master thesis. More detailed studies could e.g. include local input data, 
which in term will require closer cooperation with the owner of the power system. I think it 
would be very interesting to see how accurate the reliability calculations could be compared 
to the real-life system. Such local statistical data describing the network components are not 
easily obtained. However, I think that expert opinions and local knowledge should not be 
underestimated in such analysis. In the latter, more accurate modeling of the off-shore cable 
between Fræna and Nyhamna and the more detailed load modeling of Hustadmarmor would 
be interesting.   
Finally, further development of a methodology identifying the critical components should be 
the main focus for future work. Such work is equally important compared to the actual 
reliability calculations. Reliability indices alone doesn’t quantify reliability, several other 
factors also need to be included. The criticality studies part of this thesis clearly show that 
factors such as human safety, laws and regulations and special agreements need to be taken 
into consideration. In the latter, a consequence matrix reflecting all of the above factors is 
needed and after my opinion should be prioritized for future work.     
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Appendix 1 Istad Netbas model  
 
 
UNDERLAGT TAUSHETSPLIKT 
Iht. BfK § 6-2, jf. off.loven § 5a 
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Appendix 2 PSS®SINCAL computer model 
 
 
UNDERLAGT TAUSHETSPLIKT 
Iht. BfK § 6-2, jf. off.loven § 5a 
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Appendix 3 Calculation of the IEEE 1366 reliability indices 
 
SAIFI (system average interruption frequency index) 
∑
∑
=
T
i
N
N
SAIFI   (A3.1) 
Where, 
  
iN : Total number of interrupted customers 
TN : Total number of served customers  
  
 
SAIDI (system average interruption duration index) 
∑
∑
=
T
jj
N
Nr
SAIDI   (A3.2) 
Where, 
  
jj Nr : Customer interruption duration 
TN : Total number of served customers  
 
CAIDI (customer average interruption duration index) 
∑
∑
=
i
jj
N
Nr
CAIDI   (A3.3) 
Where, 
  
jj Nr : Customer interruption duration 
TN : Total number of interrupted customers  
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Appendix 4 Calculation of the failure models 
 
Independent single failure  
Frequency of supply interrruptions:  
EA
UN
UN G
n
H =    (A3.1) 
Where,  
 
NUN:   Total number of independent single failures. 
GEA:  Total length / number of components *. 
 
* The total length is the appropriate parameter for failures on overhead lines. The number of 
components is the appropriate parameter for failures on other components such as 
transformers and generators. 
 
Multiple earth faults 
 
Probability of supply interruption:  
( )
Netzgalv.
EA
MEErd
KME,
ME
n
G
nn
n
p
⋅+
=    (A3.2) 
Where, 
 
nME,K:  Total number of multiple earth failures. 
nE,rd+ nME: Total number of earth faults and total number of multiple earth failures.  
GEA:  The total length of overhead lines / cables in the network.     
ngalv. Netz: Correction factor related to the voltage level*. 
 
*Normally equal to 1.       
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Common Mode failures  
Frequency of supply interrruptions:  
CM
CM
CM G
n
H =    (A3.3)  
Where,  
nCM: Total number of common mode failures.  
GCM: The total length of overhead lines / cables in the network*. 
 
* Length of overhead lines / cables in parallel operation for a given voltage level.  
  
Malfunction of Protection Device  
 
Probability of supply interruption:  
fn
n
p
SA
SVS
SVS =    (A3.4) 
Where,  
nSVS: Total number of situations where the protection system have been malfunctioning.  
nSA: Total number of protection system responses.  
f: Correction factor*. 
 
* Normally equal to 2.       
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Unnecessary protection operation with multiple outages  
 
Probability of supply interruption:  
fn
n
p
⋅
=
SA
SUE
SUE    (A3.5) 
Where,  
 
nSUE Total number of Independent unnecessary protection operations.  
nSA Total number of protection system responses. 
f: Correction factor*. 
 
* Normally equal to 2.      
 
 
Independent unnecessary protection operation  
Frequency of supply interrruptions:  
EA
SPS
SPS G
n
H =    (A3.6) 
 
Where,  
 
nEA:   Total number of independent single failures. 
GEA:  Total length / number of components *. 
 
* The total length is the appropriate parameter for failures on overhead lines. The number of 
components is the appropriate parameter for failures on other components such as 
transformers and generators. 
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Appendix 5 Reliability data for the failure models 
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Appendix 6 Simulation input parameters 
 
PSS®SINCAL calculation parameters  
Function  Setting 
Calculation method  Analytic Method  
Min. failure order  0  
Max. failure order  8  
Malfunct. of prot. dev. not limited  Yes  
Unavailability threshold  1e-008  
Limitation criterion  Unavailability  
Period under consideration [h]  8760.0  
Algorithm for power flow calculation  AC-LF/Newton-Raphson  
Simultaneity factor  1  
Permissibility of solitary operation  Yes  
Time dependence of load  Annual load duration curve (DL)  
Power allocation model (only DL)  Pessimistic  
Time dependence of load  Annual load duration curve (DL)  
Switching operations  Yes  
PSS®SINCAL analysis parameters  
Function  Setting 
Type of analysis ZUBER Analysis Part  Results table  
Consideration of failure modes  CM SV ME SUE DA SP UK UL  
Limits for the failure order  No  
Limits for the frequency  No  
Limits for the duration  No  
Limits for the unavailability  No  
Limits for the interrupted power  No  
Limits for the energy not supplied  No  
Limits for the interruption cost  No  
Limits for the reimbursements  No  
Limits for the MC-time span  No  
Only failure comb. with supply interr.  Yes  
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Appendix 7 Reliability analysis results:  Power system 
 
Total power system results  
Test case H [1/year] Q [min/year] T [h] L [MVA/year] E [MVAh/year] K [NOK/year] 
1 0.71573031  142.20309590  3.31137538  28.77574921  93.07236481  3015548.00 
2 0.71611398  142.29412819  3.31171966  38.21158981  128.80671692  4173332.75  
3 0.73146850  146.84072519  3.34579730  41.55124283  141.81159973  4594698.00  
 
Istad Nett AS results  
Test case H [1/year] Q [min/year] T [h] L [MVA/year] E [MVAh/year] K [NOK/year] 
1 0.64307535 102.7056422 2.85912500 11.4909467 29.3579857 951199.73 
2 0.64347626 102.7981232 2.86114983 11.9229407 30.5629184 990238.22 
3 0.6588797 107.3818231 2.92850544 15.21923206 43.52699824 1410274.92 
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Appendix 8 Reliability analysis results:  Differentiated according to failure models.   
 
Test case 1 
Failure  
model 
H [1/year] Q [min/year] T [h] L [MVA/year] E [MVAh/year] K [NOK/year] 
UN 0.43340737 119.07388873 4.57898283 20.31118774 81.12426758 2628427.00 
CM 0.02679000 7.76289653 4.82947350 0.81647456 6.09797907 197574.53 
SV - - - - - - 
ME 0.02946952 8.58434400 4.85492802 0.60046887 2.32634354 75373.85 
SUE 0.01283708 0.38511284 0.50000066 0.31677774 0.15838887 5131.80 
SP 0.21322402 6.39671954 0.49999991 6.73080730 3.36540365 109039.07 
 
Test case 2 
Failure  
model 
H [1/year] Q [min/year] T [h] L [MVA/year] E [MVAh/year] K [NOK/year] 
UN 0.43343350  119.14368117  4.58139038  27.33817482  115.40292358  3739047.25  
CM 0.02679000  7.76289653  4.82947350  0.83882904  6.28008556  203474.78  
SV - - - - - - 
ME 0.02947675  8.59508534  4.85981083  0.61996561  2.41635513  78289.80  
SUE 0.01294969  0.38849096  0.50000024  0.37925375  0.18962720  6143.93  
SP 0.21346229  6.40386706  0.49999985  9.03535938  4.51767969  146372.84  
 
Test case 3 
Failure  
model 
H [1/year] Q [min/year] T [h] L [MVA/year] E [MVAh/year] K [NOK/year] 
UN 0.43561199  122.91153220  4.70263767  28.50660324  125.69746399  4072597.75  
CM 0.02679000  7.76289653  4.82947350  0.91261822  6.90763855  223807.50  
SV - - - - - - 
ME 0.02975321  8.98696129  5.03416920  0.72336626  3.50209832  113468.31  
SUE 0.01304526  0.39135845  0.50000066  0.40900427  0.20450214  6625.87  
SP 0.22626555  6.78796593  0.49999997  10.99963951  5.49981976  178194.11  
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Appendix 9 Reliability analysis results:  Differentiated according to voltage levels.   
 
420kV 
Test 
case  
H [1/year] Q [min/year] T [h] L [MVA/year] E [MVAh/year] K [NOK/year] 
1 0.21114582 48.65437928 3.84050369 16.36361694 62.84452820 2036162.75 
2 0.21114603 48.65440222 3.84050179 25.35016060 97.35732269 3154377.25 
3 0.21114582 48.65437928 3.84050369 25.35011482 97.35723114 3154374.25 
 
132kV 
Test 
case  
H [1/year] Q [min/year] T [h] L [MVA/year] E [MVAh/year] K [NOK/year] 
1 0.71133037 106.05619232 2.40198873 12.41208647 30.22797683 979387.44 
2 0.71173128 106.14867327 2.40356358 12.86142777 31.44929235 1018956.75 
3 0.72713472 110.73237320 2.45595128 16.20116998 44.45441218 1440323.16 
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Appendix 10 Reliability analysis results:  Differentiated according to substations.   
 
Test case 1 
Substation H [1/year] Q [min/year] T [h] L [MVA/year] E [MVAh/year] K [NOK/year] 
Nyhamna 0.21114582 48.65437928 3.84050369 16.36361694 62.84452820 2036162.75 
Hustad 0.06091687 10.64657390 2.91286945 3.40076637 9.91038513 321096.41 
Eidseter 0.32273164 38.43885783 1.98507845 4.43960571 8.81297207 285540.28 
Bolli 0.11052679 30.81890004 4.64727449 0.85199952 3.95948124 128287.20 
Moldeli 0.04410311 7.24350645 2.73733759 1.05200076 2.88003206 93313.60 
 
Test case 2 
Substation H [1/year] Q [min/year] T [h] L [MVA/year] E [MVAh/year] K [NOK/year] 
Nyhamna 0.21114603 48.65440222 3.84050179 25.35016060 97.35732269 3154377.25 
Hustad 0.06093353 10.65270034 2.91374922 3.66695070 10.68969250 346346.19 
Eidseter 0.32283089 38.44188281 1.98462439 4.52462435 8.97966766 290941.00 
Bolli 0.11052700 30.81892490 4.64726925 0.86802167 4.03392220 130699.09 
Moldeli 0.04429225 7.29862144 2.74638748 1.07582223 2.95332551 95687.38 
 
Test case 3 
Substation H [1/year] Q [min/year] T [h] L [MVA/year] E [MVAh/year] K [NOK/year] 
Nyhamna 0.21114582 48.65437928 3.84050369 25.35011482 97.35723114 3154374.25 
Hustad 0.07413208 14.58275091 3.27855134 6.48729706 22.27178764 721606.38 
Eidseter 0.32283068 38.44185604 1.98462439 4.73446560 9.39614677 304434.84 
Bolli 0.11052679 30.81889813 4.64727402 0.90819722 4.22064447 136748.89 
Moldeli 0.04560446 7.68775971 2.80957866 1.16370106 3.27798295 106206.45 
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Appendix 11 Reliability analysis results Components involved in failure combinations 
with the highest share of frequency of supply interruptions.  
 
Test case 1 
Component Name Voltage 
level 
Failure 
mode 
H  
[1/year] 
T 
[h] 
K 
[NOK/year] 
Overhead line Eidseter-Årødal 132kV UN 0.1193802953 9.56 26604.23 
Overhead line Nyhamna-Fræna 420kV UN 0.0951477289 5.26 1256236.63 
Overhead line Istad-Eidseter 132kV UN 0.0580463931 12.89 12935.80 
Overhead line Nyhamna-Fræna 420kV SP 0.0254400000 0.50 31939.57 
Busbar Hustad 132kV SP 0.0231919996 0.50 20966.20 
 
Test case 2 
Component Name Voltage 
level 
Failure 
mode 
H  
[1/year] 
T 
[h] 
K 
[NOK/year] 
Overhead line Nyhamna-Fræna 420kV UN 0.0951477289 5.26 1946131.75 
Transformer Bolli 132kV UN 0.0119521208 28.49 86633.39 
Transformer Eidseter A 132kV UN 0.0117828008 28.89 154569.28 
Busbar Nyhamna 420kV UN 0.0194969997 9.43 715191.00 
Busbar Hustad 132kV UN 0.0061476682 19.57 234513.39 
 
Test case 3 
Component Name Voltage 
level 
Failure 
mode 
H  
[1/year] 
T 
[h] 
K 
[NOK/year] 
Overhead line Nyhamna-Fræna 420kV UN 0.0951477289 5.26 1946131.75 
Transformer Bolli 132kV UN 0.0119521208 28.49 90643.64 
Transformer Eidseter A 132kV UN 0.0117828008 28.89 161738.33 
Busbar Nyhamna 420kV UN 0.01949700 9.43 715191.00 
Busbar Hustad 132kV UN 0.0061476682 19.57 309782.94 
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Appendix 12 Reliability analysis results:  Components involved in failure combinations 
with the highest share of CENS.  
 
Test case 3 
Component Name Voltage 
level 
Failure 
mode 
H  
[1/year] 
T 
[h] 
K 
[NOK/year] 
Overhead line Nyhamna-Fræna 420kV UN 0.0951477289 5.26 1946131.75 
Busbar Nyhamna 420kV UN 0.01949700 9.43 715191.00 
Busbar Nyhamna 132kV UN 0.0049580000 16.15 311407.19 
Busbar Hustad 132kV UN 0.0061476682 19.57 309782.94 
Overhead line Årødal-Moldeli 132kV CM 0.0105750002 9.64 167966.86 
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Appendix 13 Reliability analysis results:  Components involved in failure combinations 
with the longest average duration of supply interruption.  
 
Test case 1-3 
Component Name Voltage level Test case Failure mode T [h] 
Transformer Hustad T1 132kV 3 UN 29.02 
Transformer Hustad T3 132kV 3 UN 29.02 
Transformer Hustad T2 132kV 3 UN 29.02 
Transformer Moldeli T2 132kV 3 UN 28.89 
Transformer Eidseter 132kV 3 UN 28.89 
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Appendix 14 Reliability analysis results:  IEEE 1366 standard indices.  
 
Test case 1 
Index Base area 
SAIFI [1/year] 0.079 
SAIDI [min/a] 11.784 
 
Test case 2 
Index Base area 
SAIFI [1/year] 0.079 
SAIDI [min/a] 11.794 
 
Test case 3 
Index Base area 
SAIFI [1/year] 0.081 
SAIDI [min/a] 12.304 
 
 
